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.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.t\u:p-rtmt <!fond of flrt 'Jjlnittb ,jtattS' 
~ag!p:ngton., ~. <q. 21lc?J~~ 
November 1, 1973 
72-936 - U.S. v. Robinson 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~nprtutt <!fcmt cf tqt 'J[tttittlt .:§taftg 
'IJatlJrhtgtcn,JD. <!f. 20~'1-~ 
November 1, 1973 
Re: No. 72-936 -- United States v. Robinson 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I shall try my hand at a dissent 
in this case. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Confere nee 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.invrtmt a+omt of tqt 'J!lttittb ~tatts: 
'~lhts:Jringhttt. ~. at· ZLlgi'!-~ 
November 2, 1972 
Re: No. 72-936 - United States v. Robinson 
Dear Bill: 
I agree with your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
.;. 
CHAM!SERS 0,. 
.hprttttt <!fltltrl ltf tlrt ~nUt~ ~hdtg 
._,ultittgtcn. ~. <q. 2llc?'!' 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Nove_:g1ber 5, 1973 
Re: No. 72-936 - U.S. v. Robinson 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
jl.(/.. ;1 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
U· )JOV,/-' 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: JCJjr 
Re :. ' No. 72-936, United States v. Robinson 
This memorandum details some of the points you may wish 
to keep in mind in reviewing Mr. Justice Rehnquist's draft 
opinion in this case. In light of the thoroughness of our 
previous discussions and of the substantial coincidence of our 
views on this subject, I will not review all the aspects of the 
argument which I might have forumlated differently from Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist. 
Part I is satisfactory as written . 
Part II also seems to me quite acceptable, though I have 
one minor quibble with the first sentence. In fairness to Judge 
Wright and the others who adopt his view, I think it appropriate 
to point out that he considers a full field search incident to 
a lawful custodial arrest unacceptable only for a crime not 
involving evidence likely to be concealed on the person of the 
arrestee. Traffic offenses are the most common examples, but, 
as you know, there are others. Justice Rehnquist recognizes 
this aspect of Wright's position elsewhere in his opinion. I 
think it should be expressly stated here for the sakeof clarity. 
In ~art III I begin to run into trouble. First, another 
quibble. I do not see the point of foausing, as he does mid-way 
through the first paragraph, on what was "recognized in cases 
decided prior to Weeks." In this area, I would not suppose that 
precedents of that vintage would have any special authority. 
Indeed, I would be inclined to think the contrary. This paragraph 
- 2 -
introduces a series of cases that do not seem# materially to 
strengthen the Court's view. The quote from Dillon v. O'Brien 
concerns the destruction of evidence, while the excerpt from 
Closson v. Morrison only justifies a weapons search. As you 
well know, Judge Wright conceded the propriety of a weapons 
frisk for any custodial arrest and specifically limited his 
reasoning to .cases not involving evidence or fruits likely to 
be found on the person of the arrestee. I therefore view 
these authorities as inapposite here. 
The quote from Cardozo on page 13 seems to me strong and 
directly on point, but the immediately preceding excerpt from 
Holker v. Hennessey seems to me to damage the cause. That 
quote identifies three rationales for search incident to arresta 
evidence of the crime charged, identification of the suspect, and 
preventioq of an escape (weapons). I believe that our previous 
discussions reveal that a careful and narrow construction of 
these three interests does not justify the search in this case. -N~-
- ·- - l ~ 
The same comment is relevant to the ~e~ond pa~agrap~ of Cardozo )r~..J, 
,...-....,.~-- .... .,...,..,.,........ 
on page 14. The search here upheld was broader than a weapons 
search under Terry. 
II 
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 14 is ~vw - · ' _ .... -- . -inaccurate. The Cout of Appeals recognized two rationales for 
a searchr discovery of evidence and the removal of weapons. ' 
Its opinion was excellently fashioned to provide a narrow, case-by-
case limitation of the search to those r eationales. This statement 
seems to me misleading. 
This characterization of the Wright position leads into 
the discussion on pages 15-16 of the draft. !read Justice Rehnquist 
- 3 -
as impliedly embracing Judge Wilkey's argument that the patdown 
allowed by Judge Wright would be insufficent to uncover all 
dangerous weapons. As I have mentioned to you before, I find 
that unpersuasive and believe it is a weak ground on which to 
base this opinion. If the only rationale for this search was 
to diecover weapons, then the policeman should have stopped 
when he found the crumpled cigarecte pack unless he formed the 
belief that the material inside . .:-was of such a shape and character 
that it might be a weapon. 
I find the more general discussion beginning on page 16 
very much to the point. 
The only other comment I have is that you might consider 
the wisdom of making some reference to the difficulty of confining 
Judge Wright's reasoning to traffic offenses . and to the fact that 
a full field search incident to a custodial arrest almost always 
duplicates a pre-detention inventory search. It seems to me - - _..- -
that Jus~&ce Rehnquist would strengthen the argument begun 
mid-say on page 16 by some reference to these points. 
Of course, I shall be happy to discuss these observations 




TO: Mr. Justice Rehnquist DATE: November 7, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 72-936 United states v. Robinson 
I intend to join your opinion, but I wish to make three suggestions 
for your consideration. 
1. I believe that the opinion would be strengthened by an explicit 
statement of a proposition that I find implicit throughout your argument, 
namely, that a person lawfully subjected to custodial arrest retains no 
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. In 
the paragraph beginning on page 16, you reject the idea "that there must 
be litigated in each ease the issue of whether or not there was present 
one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person 
incident to arrest." The concluding sentence of his discussion states 
what I believe to be the core of the opinion: 
"It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the 
authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a 
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is 
not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search 
under that Amendment." 
I fully agree with this statement, It impliedly recognizes the proper role 
of the Fourth Amendment - to prevent unwarranted governmental intrusions 
into areas of an individual's life about which he entertains legitimate 
2. 
expectations of privacy. Whatever the ancillary consequences of this 
eanstttutional guarantee, its purpose is not to allow those who have 
committed crimes to go undetected, but rather to shield innocent citizens 
from unjustifiable invasions of privacy in the name of law enforcement. 
I •tew the custodial arrest as the significant intrusion of sUite power 
into the realm of individual affairs normally termed private. Assuming 
that the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth 
Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental 
Jnterest. At that point the arrestee retains no signifiCant interest in the 
privacy of his person. No reason exists to hamper law enforcement by 
requiring some independent justification for a search incident to a lawful 
arrest. This seems to me the reason that the fact of lawful arrest 
even 
justifies a full search of the person/if that search is not narrowly limited 
to seizing evidence or disarming the arrestee. In other words, the search 
incident to lawful arrest is necessarily reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional 
guarantee is substantially and legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 
If you agree that this is the essential premise underlying your opinion, 
perhaps you can emphasize it along the foregoing lines. I think the 
opinion would be strengthened 1f this were expressly stated. 
2. The quotation from Hulker v. Hennessey on page 13 unnecessarily 
detracts from the strength of your argument. I read the quotation as 
identifying three rationales for a search incident to arrest, none of which 
is present in this case. To the extent that some may assume that the 
three stated reasons are exclusive, the quotation may undercut somewhat 
the force of your reasoning elsewhere in the opinion. 
3. Finally, I point out what to me at least ls a potential ambiguity. 
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 14 and the first sentence 
of the next paragraph might leave the impression that the Court of Appeals 
plurality failed to recognize the police officer's legitimate need to disarm 
an.a.rrestee. I believe your description of Judge Wright's reasoning is 
entirely accurate, but some potential for confusion exists. Perhaps the 
difficulty could be avoided by italicizing the word "full" near the bottom 
of page 14. 
• * * * 
I hope these suggestions wUl not add to your burdens. You have 
a court in sight, but I do not think the foregoing would reduce your 
constituency. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;%uprtmt <If~ ~f tfrt ,-mttb ;%bdtg 
ji'u!p:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2ll~'!6J 
November 8, 1973 
Re: No. 72-936 - United States v. Robinson 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your suggestions about the draft opinion. 
I think that some language such as you suggest in the first 
paragraph of your note would strengthen the opinion, and I 
propose to include some along the lines described later in 
this note; the quotation from Hennessey may not be ideal, but 
I think it does serve the purpose of shedding some light about 
how courts viewed this proposition during the last century; 
there just aren't too many cases to choose from. I think 
your suggestion in the third paragraph is a very happy one, 
and I incorporate it as made. 
1. I agree with the observations contained in your 
first paragraph, but would prefer to have the language 
actually added to the opinion take a somewhat narrower tack. 
I am frankly skeptical of generalized summaries of the 
meaning of constitutional provisions which, while considered 
in the context of the case make perfectly good sense and are 
undoubtedly correct, can be taken out of context in some 
later litigation and urged to stand for a quite different 
proposition than they were intended to speak. If a more 
modest reprise of your paragraph 1 is acceptable, I would 
propose the following language to be inserted immediately 
before the last sentence in Part III of the opinion: 
- 2 -
"A custodial arrest of a suspect based on 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion 
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion 
having taken place, a search incident to 
the arrest requires no additional justifica-
tion. It is the fact of the lawful arrest 
. . . etc. 11 
I am probably obligated to circulate this sentence to 
those who have already joined the opinion, ·and will be happy 
to do so if it sufficiently advances your purpose. 
My reaction to your paragraphs (2) and (3) are pretty 
well spelled out in the earlier part of this note. 
Sincerely !Jill' 
P.S. I have offered a clerkship to Bill Jacobs, whom you 
recommended and by whom I was very much impressed in the 
personal interview. WHR 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
K OS. 72- 936 AND 71- 1669 
United States, Petitioner, 
72-936 v. 
Willie Robinson. Jr. 
.•. 
James E. Gustafson. 
Petitioner, 
71- 1669 V. 
State of Florida .. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit . 
) 
On \Yrit of Certiorari to the 
Rupreme Court of Florida. 
[November -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL. concurring. 
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write 
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential 
premise of our decisions. 
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of "the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... " 
These are areas of an individual's life about which he 
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe 
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest 
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the 
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial 
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the 
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the 
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is 
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding govern-
mental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law 
enforcement by requiring some independent justification 
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This 
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full 
search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly 
72-936 & 71-1669-CONCUR 
2 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 
limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and 
disarming the arrestee.1 The search incident to arrest 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the 
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guar-
antee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.2 
1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this 
rationale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960): 
"Power over the body of the accused is the essence of his arrest; 
the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail 
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging UJ10n the 
sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to 
ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting authori-
ties. Custody must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever 
the arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension. 
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical 
dominion of the law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose, 
cannot be deemed unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of 
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetra-
tion." [Citations omitted.] 
2 In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the cus-
todial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in 
Robinson. Gustafson would haYe presented a different question if 
the petitioner could haYe proved that he was taken into custody 
only to a.fford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for col-
latoral objectives. But no such question is before us. 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NOS. 72-936 AND 71-1669 
United States, Petitioner, 
72-936 v. 
Willie Robinson, Jr. 
James E. Gustafson, 
Petitioner, 
71-1669 V. 
State of Florida. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
) 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Florida. 
[November -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write 
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential 
premise of our decisions. 
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of "the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... " 
These are areas of an individual's life about which he 
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe 
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest 
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the 
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial 
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the 
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the 
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is 
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding govern-
mental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law 
enforcement by requiring some independent justification 
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This 
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full 
search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly 
72-936 & 71-1669-CONCUR 
2 UNITED STATES v. IWRIKSON 
limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and 
disarming the arrestee.1 The search jncjdent to arrest 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the 
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guar-
antee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 2 
1 The Court of Appl'als for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this 
rationale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960): 
"Power ovl'r the body of the accused is the e:,;sence of his arrest; 
the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail 
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging upon the· 
sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to 
ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting authori-
ties. Custody must of necessity be asserted initia.lly over whatever 
the arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension. 
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physicaf 
dominion of the law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose, 
cannot be deemed unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of 
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetra-
tion." [Citations omitted.] 
2 In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the cu~­
todial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in 
Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a different question if 
the petitioner could have proved that he was taken into custody 
only to afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for col-
lateral objectives. But no such question is before us. 
Dear Bill: 
1973 
72-936 United states v. Robinson 
71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida 
Please join me in your opinions in the above cases. 
As we discussed, I will circulate a brief concurrence which 
wlll net in any way be incompatible with what you have written. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iUFtmt (!fo:urlltf tltt~lt~ .§hdtil 
~ufringhtn. to. <q:. 2llp>t~ 
November 29, 1973 
Re: No. 72-936 - U. S. v. Robinson 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
~u.pwnc ~cnrt cf tire ):1ttttd~ ,§tntl's 
'W~'h'ltingiott. p. ~· 2llb}J~2 
CHAMBER S OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS December 5, 1973 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissent in 
72-936, u.s. v. Robinson. 
c~j () () 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
~U}tt:fltl~ QflHt.rt rtf tlt~~~llitdt .§l'1 ttl•!.! 
'JJID'a!tLp!tg-tatt, g1. <.q. 2trgi>L~l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JusTicE wM. J . BRENNAN. JR. December 6, 1973 
RE: No. 72-936 United States v. Robinson 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
NOS. 72-936 AND 71-1669 
United States, Petitioner, 
72- 936 v. 
Willie Robinson, Jr. 
James E. Gustafson, 
Petitioner, 
71-1669 v. 
State of Florida. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
On \Vrit of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Florida. 
[December 11 , 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write 
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential 
premise of our decisions. 
The Fourth Amendment safcguarus the right of "the 
people to be secure in their persons. houses. papers, and 
effects. against unreasonable searches and seizures .... " 
These are areas of an individual's life about which he 
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe 
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest 
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the 
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial 
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the 
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the 
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is 
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding govern-
mental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law 
enforcement by requiring some independent justification 
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This 
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full 
search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly 
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limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and 
disarming the arrestee.1 The search incident to arrest 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the 
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guar-
antee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 2 
1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this 
rn.tionale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960): 
"Power over the body of the accused is the e;;;;ence of his arrest; 
the two cannot be separnted. To say that the police may curtail 
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging up!'ln the 
sanctity of his pocket;; except for enumerated reasons is to 
ignore the cu::itodial dutie;; which devolve upon arrcHting authori-
ties. Custody muHt of neees:>ity be asserted initially over whateYer 
the arrested party h:ts in his possession at the time of apprehension. 
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical 
dominion of the law, inspections of his per~on, regardless of purpose, 
cannot be deemed unlnwful, unless they violate the dictates of 
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetra-
tion." [Citations omitted.] 
2 In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the cus-
todial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in 
Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a different question if 
the petitioner could have proved that he was taken into custody 
only to afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for col-
lateral objectives. But no such question is before us. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
Nos. 72-936 AND 71-1669 
United States, Petitioner, 
72-936 v. 
Willie Robinson, Jr. 
James E. Gustafson, 
Petitioner, 
71-1669 V. 
State of Florida. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
On ·writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Florida. 
[December 11, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
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United States v. 
-
Robinson 
This is the SG's cert petn in a case that we have 
been waiting for •• Recall that several months ago we had 
a case styled Gustafson v. Florida, in which two college 
boys were stopped, arrested, and given a full body search 
during which two marijuana cigarettes were discovered in --a cigarette package. That case is presently being held 
for Robinson. 
I worked on this case for Judge McGowan. We wrote 
the initial remand order sendning the case back to the DC 
I 
to develop facts on the question whether officers need a 
full body search to protect themselves when they are taking 
a person into custody. The CA's conclusion after the c~se ------ ----·- -
came back up was that no such intrisu~e search was necessary 
to protect the legitimate interests of the police. 
The SG chatHllenges that conclusio n. He also sugges~s -that the Ct should take the cue from the ALI and adopt a 
"!!."•' 
--2--
case-by-case appraoch to the exclusionary rule, throwing 
"----· - ...... ' ... 
out probative evidence only when the facts are outrageous. - --
This is the English ~odel; it has been recently rejected 
by the ABA, although the ALI approves of it (as does CA 
\vright). 
I think both questions are important. I would grant 
the case to consider (1) whether the search incident to 
a custodial arrest may be broader than a Terry pa.tdown, 
and (2) whether the exclusionary should be reshaped. 
NOTE: If the case is taken it will immediately become one 
of the major cases for next Term, since it would pose the 
most fougdational questions for the future of the exclusion-
ary rule. Therefore, I suggest that this case be singled 
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Cert to CA D. C. (en bane) 
(Wright, McGowan, Leventhal, 
Robinson; Bazelon, concurring; 
Wilkey, Tamm, MacKinnon, 
Robb, dissenting) 
Federal-Criminal Timely 
1. Resp was convicted in the USDC D. C. (Jones) on two heroin 
DG 
counts . CA. (Wright, Leventhal; Wilkey dissenting) reversed on grounds 
that the heroin had been taken in an unreasonable search of resp incident -
to a traffic offense arrest. The CA en bane vacated the decision and 
remanded for further fact-finding. Then the CA sustained the original 
panel's reversal of the conviction in a 5-4 .decision. Petr contends that the 
heroin evidence was taken in a lawful search incident to resp' s arrest. 
- 2 -
2. FACTS: On April 19, 1968, Officer Jencks stopped resp in ... a 
car for a "routine traffic check. 11 The officer noted that resp' s driver's 
license and draft card showed different dates of birth. Resp was allowed 
to go free, but the officer checked resp' s driving records. He discovered 
that a license issued in resp' s name had been revoked but that a temporary 
driving permit had been taken out later in resp' s name under a different 
date of birth. In D. C. driving after revocation of a driving permit is 
punishable by a mandatory minimum jail term of 30 days, with a maximum 
of one year. Summary arrest of the violator is required of the apprehending 
\ 
officer. 
field search" in making any "full custody" arrest. 
D. C. Police Dept. regulations require officers to conduct a "full 
On April 23 Officer Jencks observed resp driving with ~o 
companions. Resp was asked to show his temporary license again, and -
upon compliance Jencks told him he was under arrest. Jencks began his 
search with a pat down of resp' s chest area. He felt an object, but 
could not tell"anything aboutho.vhard the object was or how soft it was," 
·nor could he tell its size. Jencks then reached into resp' s breast pocket -
and removed what turned out to be a crumpled up cigarette packaye. He 
could feel "objects" in the package but could not tell what they were. He 
opened the package and found 14 gelatin capsules of white powder, whi'\h 
proved to be heroin. Officer Jencks then completed his search, including 




The CA en bane held the search unreasonable. Both the majority 
and minority judges agreed that the only permissible purpose for a search 
incident to arrest for a traffic offense (though serious, as here) is for 
police protection. It was also conceded by all that Officer Jencks exceeded 
the scope of a limited Terry v. Ohio frisk for weapons. (Terry involved 
the search of a suspect where there was no probable cause to arrest.) 
Officer Jencks did not indicate at trial that he believed the object he felt 
under resp' s coat to be a weapon: "I just searched him. I didn't think 
about what I was looking for. I just searched him." The disputed issue 
was the permissible extent of a search for weapons under the circumstances 
.J 
here involved. 
The majority relies on Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
There defendant was arrested by an off-duty policeman who suspected him 
of attempting to burglarize an apartment. The arrest was upheld. The 
subsequent pat-down search followed by the removal of an object from 
defendant's pocket that felt like a knife but turned out to be burglar tools was 
reasonable. But the Court added: "Moreover, it [the search] was 
reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not 
engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his 
personal effects." At 67. 
The majority holds that the police are limited to a frisk search 
when arresting for traffic offenses. A Terry frisk is capable of locating 
.----
virtually every type of concealed weapon. Conceding that there will always 
be the "long shot case" where a frisk will not reveal a novel weapon, the 
- 4 -
arrestee's right to privacy outweighs this slight risk. Furthermore, it 
is not just a question of delaying a search that will have to be made at the 
station house. The CA D. C. has held that where one is arrested for a traffic 
offense and has a right to put up collateral or make bail, the police may 
not search the arrestee until he has h9-d an opportunity to secure his lawful 
· release. 
Judge Wilkey, for the dissenting judges, disputes that resp' s 
arrest did not justify a full search for protection. Here the arresting 
officer was following standard regulations promulgated on the basis of 
experience with a great number of arrests. Individual rights are more 
likely to be protected if the police follow such reasonable regulations than 
if they are forced to make ad hoc judgments on the proper type of search -
to fit each specific situation. The offense here, driving after revocation 
of one ' s permit, does not hold the same possibilities for pretextual arrest 
as do offenses like speeding, which do not necessitate an arrest, may be. -
The danger to the policeman who must arrest a suspect and transport him 
to the police station is significantly greater than in stop-and-frisk situations: 
especially the danger from small weapons effective at close range increases. 
Many such small concealed weapons may not be discovered in a pat-down 
search. Furthermore, the fact that Officer Jencks looked into the 
cigarette package, instead of merely retaining it in his possession, is 
~lerh<-\. 
also justified; the presence of a weapon would have a1tQr8d the officer to t h e 
greater danger that the arrestee would have other concealed weapons . 
- 5 -
Judge Wilkey also argues that the search here was less intrusive than the 
search authorized by Terry. (Feeling with "sensitive fingers" every 
portion of the suspect's body). 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG emphasizes the dangers of a custodial 
arrest as opposed to a stop-- regardless of the suspected offense. -
The majority struck an improper balance between police safety and the 
right of a person arrested on probable cause to his privacy. Officer 
Jencks was following reasonable police regulations, standardized pro-
cedures important in controlling police conduct. It is important, therefore, 
-to take a broad view of the reasonableness of such regulations. The 
majority below places too much weight on the fact that Jencks subjectively 
had no specific thought that the cigarette package was a weapon. 
(Presumably if he had so thought, he could have at least removed it to 
see what it was.) Finally, even if the search was illegal, the exclusionary 
rule should not be extended here. The A. L. I. 1 s balancing approach to 
deciding whether to invoke the exclusionary rule in a particular situation 
is set out. 
Resp notes that the decision below will affect few cases. Traffic 
offenses are about the only offense where the officer has no right to search 
for evidence incident to an arrest. The risk that an arresting officer might 
be injured by a concealed weapon that could not be dis covered in a proper 
Terry frisk is minimal. In this case there was no reason whatsoever for 
the arresting officer to believe resp has committed any offense other than 
- 6 -
the traffic violation or that he had any weapons. The real purpose of the 
"full field search" in this situation has been to the discovery of evidence 
of unrelated crimes. A Terry frisk is fully adequate to protect the 
arresting officer in this situation. 
4. DISCUSSION: The is sue here seems reasonably important 
and has not been settled by this Court. The CA cites numerous decisions 
of other courts supporting its result, but the gov't distinguishes these as 
involving vehicle searches, stops (as opposed to arrests), optional arrests 
(as opposed to mandatory arrests, as was the case here.), and arrests 
for offenses carrying no imprisonment. Given the difficulty of the issue 
involved, its intimate connection with past decisions of this Court, and the 
particular facts of the case, I believe the case is clearly certworthy. 
There is a response. 
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REPORT ON WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, court-
ordered wiretapping and electronic sur-
veillance authorized by title m of the 
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968" is playing a key role 
in the war against crime. As the Attor-
ney General testified on April 5 before 
the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions: 
The provision for •.• (wiretapping) by 
Congress bas been the most significant, most 
Important weapon that our country has bad 
to deal effectively with the problem of orga-
nized crime .••• Now after four and a half 
yoors we have more than one-half or the 
leadership of organized crime In the coun-
try under Indictment. 
His testimony was also underscored ::,y 
that of the Assistant Attorney General 
for Narcotics: 
I would say wiretapping Is one of the prin-
cipal tools needed and necessary to develop 
major conspiracy . . . cases. It Is expensive. 
It is time-consuming. It Is very tedious In-
vestigative work. It takes an awful lot of 
manpower to operate taps and surveillance 
devices. But it Is an absolutely effective and 
necessary tool. 
Mr. President, during 1972, there were 
855 orders for intercepts issued by.Fed-
eral and State judges, and 2,861 arrests 
fiowed from the information obtained. 
So far, 402 convictions have already re-
sulted, and more are expected. This is 
compelling evidence of the effectiveness 
of wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance in combating organized crime. 
In order to protect the public and keep 
it informed, title m of the act provides 
that prosecutors who seek surveillance 
orders and judges who issue them are re-
quired to file detailed reports each year 
to the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts. The Administrator is required to 
transmit to Congress a summary and 
analysis of this information. 
These public disclosure provisions re-
fiect the judgment of Congress that com-
plete and regular public accounting is 
essential to any system requiring the use 
of electronic surveillance techniques--no 
matter how limited its use. Public sup-
port for the power to wiretap and bug-
even under authorization--<:an only be 
obtained where the citizenry is respon-
sibly informed as to the extent and char-
acter of its use. 
Senate 
The Fifth Annual Surveillance report 
which has just been released by the 
Director of the Administrative Office in-
dicates that eighteen of the 21 juris-
dictions which have laws authorizing 
courts to issue surveillance ordered used 
their statutes in 1972. 
In these 18 jurisdictions, Federal judges 
signed 206 orders for intercepts and 
649 were signed by State judges. Of the 
649 State orders, 294 or 45 percent were 
issued in New York, while 235 or 36 per-
cent were issued in New Jersey. . 
The 855 applications filed during 1972 
compares with 596 applications filed in 
1970. On the Federal level, the decrease 
from-285 in 1971 to 206 in 1972 results 
from a shift in emphasis by the Depart-
ment of Justice from gambling to narco-
tics and other offenses. In narcotics cases, 
it is usually more difficult to establish the 
probable cause required to authorize the 
tap. · 
In 1971 and 1972, the Justice Depart-
ment mounted an extraordinary effort to 
deal with syndicated gambling, relying 
principly on electronic surveillance. In 
1971, 251 of its 285 applications were in 
the gambling field. Only 22 were for nar-
cotics. In contrast, 146 of its 1972 orders 
were for gambling, while the narcotic fig-
ure rose to 35. 
During 1971-72, 8 known or suspected 
organized crime figures were convicted, 
including the head of the New Jersey 
syndicate and high ranking members of 
the Genovese-New York and Detroit syn-
dicates. Twenty-eight more such figures, 
including the heads of the Brooklyn, 
Kansas City and Florida syndicates, and 
two high-ranking members of the Cleve-
land syndicates were indicted. 
Mr. President, I am hopeful that the 
shift in emphasis to narcotics cases will 
now carry with it a similar record of ac-
hievement. 
On the State level, the rise in sur-
veillance orders from 531 in 1971 to 649 in 
1972 represents an increasing pattern of 
utilization of State statutes authorizing 
surveillance by States other than New 
York and New Jersey. I am confident 
that when all of the States begin to use 
the authority concurred by the 1968 act, 
they, too, will have a record of success in 
combating crime through the use of 
electronic surveillance techniques. 
On the Federal level, of 206 author-
ized intercepts, 205 were installed and 48 
extensions were granted. The 205 au-
thorizations were granted for an average 
length of 16 days; the extensions were 
granted for an average of 15 days. The 
State picture varied. In New Jersey, for 
example, of the 68 authorized intercepts 
of the Attorney General's Office, 67 were 
installed and 13 extensions were granted. 
The 67 authorizations were granted for 
an average length of 18 days; the exten-
sions for 21 days. 
Of the 841 devices installed in 1972 on 
the Federal and State level, 779 involved 
a telephone wiretap. Twenty-nine ap-
plications si>eCified a microphone device, 
and 28 requests specified both a tele-
phone tap and a microphone. 
The offenses specified in the 841 ap-
plications covered a wide range of crim-
inal activity, but several broad categories 
of crime predominated: gambling 497; 
narcotics 230; homicide and assault 35; 
larceny 22; loan sharking 13; and re-
ceiving stolen property 31. 
In 1972 the average intercept involved 
51 persons and 600 intercepts, of which 
303 or 50.5 percent were incriminating. 
In contrast, in 1971 the average wiretap 
involved 40 persons and 643 intercepts, 
of which 399 or 60 percent were incrimi-
nating. In Federal cases during 1972, the 
average intercept involved 66 persons 
and 1,023 intercepts, of which 614 or 
60 percent were incriminating. In 1971 
the average intercept involved 53 per-
sons and 916 intercepts, of which 648 or 
71 percent were incriminating. 
The increase in the number of persons 
involved in surveillance and correspond-
ing decrease in the percentage of incrim-
inating intercepts is attributable to the 
shifting character of the offenses under 
surveillance. In 1971, gambling led the 
list with 570 ordered; while in 1972 the 
gambling figure dropped to 497. In 1971, 
there were only 126 narcotics cases. In 
1972, the narcotic's figure had increased 
to 230. Experience has shown that it is 
relatively easier to focus on incriminat-
ing telephone calls in the gambling area, 
while in the narcotics field, it is neces-
sary to conduct surveillance over an in-
creased number of conversations to ob-
tain incriminating evidence. 
Nevertheless, to show the extraordi-
narily limited character of even this sur-
veillance, statistics furnished by the 
~mertcan Telephone & Telegraph Co. to 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures, which I am privileged to 
chair, show that there are approximately 
119 miH1on telephones. including exten-
'ns, in the United States and that they 
J used to make more than 159 billion 
calls each year. The percentage of calls, 
therefore, subject to surveillance in 1972 
is almost too small to calculate. It is less 
than .0000039 percen t . The privacy of 
the average citizen, in short, is not 
threatened by the court ordered sur-
veillance authorized by title m . 
Indeed, the 1968 act prohibits wire-
tapping not authorized by the courts. 
And these provisions, too, have been · 
used with significant effect. 
The first conviction obtained under 
title m, for example, was that of Enid 
Roth, an NBC program director, who 
pleaded nolo contendere to a count alleg-
ing illegal interception of proceedings of 
the platform committee of the National 
Democratic Party during the 1968 con-
vention by means of a microphone con-
cealed behind a curtain in a conference 
room. The most important case yet de-
veloped under the 1968 act, however, has 
been the Watergate affair. The investi-
gation, prosecutions, and convictions in 
this case were all made possible by the 
1968 act. Without it; we would not have 
had available on the books a Federal 
felony punishable by 5 years imprison-
ment and a $10,000 fine (18 U.S.C. 
2511>. As tragic and regrettable as this 
whole affair has been, I a.m glad that 
the 1968 act could be used to bring these 
men to justice. The Senate can know that -
it did its part in ·strengthening this as-
pect of the law, too. 
The total cost of each intercept-man-
power and equipment-ranged from a 
low of $5 to a high of $82,628, with the 
average intercept nationally running 
$5,435, and the average Federal intercept 
running $9,795. The figures should do a 
great deal to relieve the fears of some 
citizens of an excessive use of these tech-
niques by legitimate law-enforcement 
agents. Most police departments, includ-
ing the Federal law-enforcement agen-
cies, simply do not have the manpower 
and other resources to conduct wide-
spread or indiscriminate surveillance. 
Most of the cases in which there were 
intercepts reported are, of course, still 
under investigation or are awaiting trial. 
Indeed, the studies of the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures indi-
cate that the average delay from indict-
ment to trial in organized crime cases is 
22.5 months. Consequently, conviction re-
sults will always lag behind arrests. 
Nevertheless, the 1972 annual report, as 
I have said, indicates that as of December 
31, 1972, 2,861 arrests had resulted from 
intercepts made during last year. In ad-
dition, 402 convictions have been ob-
tained. 
Recognizing that arrests and convic-
tions would lag behind surveillance, title 
liT required supplementary reports to be 
filed on the results of past year's surveil-
lance. According to these supplementary 
reports, during 1972, there were 732 ar-
rests and 1,193 convictions as a result of 
intercepts installed in previous years. 
Taken together with the data from pre-
vious annual reports, this indicates from 
June 1968 to December 1972, there have 
been 2,742 orders which have yielded 
6,956 arrests, and 2,495 convictions. 
These are indeed impressive figures, and 
certainly should put to rest any sug-
gestion that wiretapping is ineffective in 
combating crime. 
Mr. President, to gain a sense of the 
concrete results of electronic surveil-
lance, it may be helpful to look at the 
facts of several cases in which intercepts 
brought otherwise elusive lawbreakers 
to justice. 
On June 1, 1971, a Federal jury found 
Martin and Jesse Sklaroff guilty of 
transmission of gambling information. 
This was the first Federal wiretap un-
der title m. It was in operation 6 days.--
171 conversations were involved, of 
which 161 were incriminating-94 per-
cent. The telephone was in a public booth 
in the Miami International Airport; vis-
ual surveillance was maintained on the 
booth, so that the tap was in operation 
only when the suspect entered the booth. 
When Sklaroff, one of the Nation's lead-
ing layoff men-the underworld figure 
who relnsures bets-was convicted, he 
told the Atlanta Journal on June 1, 1971: 
You can't work with a telephone-I'm 
gonna have to find another business. The 
Federal wiretaps are going to put us au out 
of business. 
The case Is now on appeal in the Fifth 
Circuit. 
On October 13, 1971, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided United. States 
v. Cox. 449 F. 2d 679 <lOth ctr. 1971), 
cert. d.enfed, 406 U.S. 934 (1972), in 
which it sustained the constitutionality 
of title m and a:lllrmed the conviction 
in the appeal before it. 
The case involved four bank robbers 
whose conversations were overheard 
during the course of a wiretap issued in 
a narcotics investigation. The wiretap 
was installed for 19 days on a residential 
telephone; 1,216 intercepts were in-
volved, of which 157 were incrimtnat-
ing-12 percent. This one wp-etap has 
resulted in 19 convictions: n for nar-
cotics, four for bank robbery, and one 
for assault on a Federal narcotics agent. 
In q.ddition to uncovering the scope of 
the narcotics ring and solving the bank 
·robbery, the officers were able to prevent 
a murder with information overheard on 
the tap. 
Finally, when Cox's narcotics convic-
tion was appealed, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.in United. States v. Cox, 
462 F. 2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), followed 
the lead ot: the Tenth Circll.it and sus-
tained the constitutionality of title m 
and aftirmed that conviction, too. 
Indeed, only one district court to date 
has upheld a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the various provisions of 
title m. In United. States v. Whitaker, 
343 F . Supp. 358 <E.D. Pa. 1972>, Judge 
Joseph Lord m held title m unconsti-
tutional. I am pleased to report, however, 
that his decision was reversed by the 
Third Circuit on February 27, 1973. 
More recently, on April 5, 1973, in 
United States against Tortorello, the 
Second Court of Appeals sustained both 
the constitutionality of title m and a 
New York State statute modeled on 
title m, in aftirming the stock fraud con-
viction of Arthur Tortorello. 
Tortorello's criminal record began in 
2. 
1929-more than four decades ago. A 
member of the Gambino syndicate in 
New York City, he collected arrests 
ranging from burglary, assault and bat-
tery, and forgery to a 1-year SCI'tence 
for kidnaping. The New York County 
District Attorney's Office obtained in 
1969 a series of wiretap and surveillance 
orders m connection with an investiga-
tion of stolen property and forged in-
struments. The execution of the orders 
uncovered a complex fraudulent scheme 
in which Tortorello conspired to dispose 
of thousands of unregistered and worth-
less stock to the unsuspecting public. 
Tortorello has now been convicted and 
sentenced to 5 years in jail and a $10,000 
fine. As in the Sklaroff and Cox cases, 
the indispensable key to his conviction 
was the surveillance orders authorized 
by titlem. 
Mr. President, I am proud to have been 
associated with the effort that led to the 
enactment of title m of the 1968 act. 
I am pleased, too, that the effort of the 
Senate to strengthen law enforcement 
with this necessary tool has met and 
passed its constitutional tests in the 
courts. It vindicates, I thJnk, the Senate's 
judgment to include title m in the 1968 
act. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimons con-
sent that the following exhibits appear 
in the REcoRD at the conclusion of my 
remarks. 
Exhibit No. 1, jurisdictions with stat-
utes authorizing the interception of wire 
or oral communications, January 1, 1972, 
to December 31, 1972. 
Exhibit No. 2, court-authorized Fed· 
eral electronic surveillance. 
Exhibit No. 3, summary report on au· 
thorized intercepts granted. 
Exhibit No. 4, known or suspected or-
ganized crime figures prosecuted under 
Federal antigambling laws. 
Exhibit No. 5, gambling operations in-
dicted by Organized Crime and Racket-
eering Section during fiscal year 1971. 
Exhibit No. 6, conviction of persons 
involved in major gambling rings, fiscal 
year 1972. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
EXHIBIT I.-JURISDICTIONS WITH STATUTES AUTHORIZ· 
lNG THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNI· 
CATIONS EFFECTIVE DURING THE PERIOD JAN, 1, 1972 
TO DEC. 31, 1972 




FederaL _____ ___ 18:2510 to 2520 _______ ___ ___ Yes. 
Arizona __________ 13:105lto 13:1059 _____ : ____ Yes. 
C~lorado _________ 4tl-4--26 to 46-4- 33 __ __ ______ Yes, 
ConnecticuL ___ __ Public Act No. 68 .. , _________ Yes. 
Delaware __ ______ 11 :XLII.757 __ : ________ ____ .. Yes. 
Florida __________ 934.01 to 934.10 ___ ___ _______ Yes. 
Georgia __________ 26-3001to 26-3010 __________ Yes. 
Kansas ___ _______ 22- 2513 ___ ____ ·--·-·-·----- Yes. 
Maryland ___ _____ 3!>-92 to 35-99 _______ __ _____ Yes. 
Massachusetts ____ 272-99 ____ _______ __________ Yes. 
Minnesota _______ 626A.O) to 626A.23 ___ ___ ,,_ Yes. 
Nebraska ____ __ __ 86- 701 to 86-707 __ ______ __ __ Yes. 
Nevada. __ __ __ ___ 200.6l0 to 200.690 _______ ____ Yes. 
New Hampshire __ 570- A:1 to 57o-A :ll ______ ___ No. 
New Jersey_, __ _ 2A:156A-1 to 2A:156A- 26 __ ., Yes. 
New York __ __ ___ , 813-J to 813-M; 814to 825 ___ Yes. 
Oregon ___ _______ 141.720 to 141.900 ___ ____ __ __ Yes. 
Rhode Island ___ __ 12- 5.1- 1 to 12-5.1- 16 ____ ____ Yes. 
South Dakota _____ 23- 13A- llo 23-13A- Il ___ ___ No. -
Washington ______ 9.73.030 to 9.73.080; __ ___ ____ No. 
Wisconsin ________ 968.27 to 968.33 ____ _____ ____ Yes. 




C011.rt Authorized Federal Electronic 
Surveillance 
889 court orders have been obtained and ex-
ecuted are as follows: 
Theft and Robbery _____ _____ _____ ____ _ 3 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
During the years 1969 through April 24, 
1973, a total of 889 court orders (Including 
183 extensions) have been obtained and ex-
ecuted in connection wit h Federal Investiga-
t ions. 
CJa01bling ----- --- ---- -------- - ------- 653 
Narcotics -----------------,- --------- 152 
Extortionate Credit Transactions_______ 38 
Organizations -~------------ ----- ---
Obstruction of Justice __________ __ ____ _ 
Kldnappl.ng --- --- ------ ----------- -- -






Counterfeiting ------------------ ----- 12 
Interstate Transportation of Stolen Interference with Commerce _____ _____ _ 
Property --------------------------- 15 
The categories of offenses In which the Bribery ------------------------- - ---- 5 Total 889 
EXHIBIT NO. 3 
SUMMARY REPORT ON AUTHORIZED INTERCEPTS GRANTED PURSUANT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE. SECTION 2518 JUNE 20-DEC. 31. 1958, JAN. I DEC. 31, 1969 THROUGH 1972 
Reporting period 
1972 1 Summary item 1 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Intercept applications authorized. ___ .. _ 17( 301 596 816 855 
Feder.ll. --------------------- ___ -- --- .. . _. 33 182 285 206 
State ...•. ----------- ---. ___ ----- 17( 268 414 531 649 
Average length of original authori-
zation (days>----- -------------- 20 23 22 22 22 Number of extensions ___ __ ________ 128 200 237 228 246 
Average length of extensions 
(days) _______ ------------- 20 21 20 24 24 
location of authorized intercept : Residence. ____ . __ ___ _______ _ 67 134 203 3(2 351 
Apartment. ..• ------------ ___ 49 68 163 211 218 Multrple dwelling __ __ _________ 10 14 39 45 56 
Business __ _ ------ ___________ 45 71 121 134 120 
Business and living quarters .•.. . ------ ·- . 5 30 40 48 
Nolindicatedorother____ _____ 3 9 40 44 62 
Major offenses specified in applica-
lion: 
1 Arson and explosives ___ ______ I 13 2 2 
Bribery_-- -- -- - ------------- 5 11 16 16 9 
Drugs .• ____ _______ .-------·_ 71 89 127 126 230 
Extortion (includes usury and 
loansharking) . .•• . •. ... -.-- 13 10 17 5 13 Gambling ____________ _______ _ 20 102 325 570 497 
Homicide and assault . ..•.•••• 22 19 21 18 35 
l.arceny _ --- --- --- -- ------ --- 19 10 31 31 22 
1 See reverse side lor minor revisions of previously published data. · 
• Installed intercepts includes only those inten:epts where a report was received from a prosecut-
ing attorney. 
Reporting period 
Summary item 1 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Robbery ___ . _______ ___ ____ .• _ 8 24 13 11 9 other_ •. ___ ___ __ _ ----- - _____ 15 35 33 31 38 
Intercept applications installed•_ - ----- 147 270 582 792 841 
Federal. __ . __ ------------- --------- ---- __ _ 30 179 281 205 
State ___ .. ---.--- -- ------------- 147 240 403 511 638 
For authorized intercepts inSialled: 
Actual number of days in use ..• •NA 9, 018.0 11.190.5 14.582.5 15.561 
Al~:~~eJ.~~-~~--~~ -~~~~- 29 53 « 40 51 
Average number of inten:epted 
communications __ ~ ________ _ 454 544 656. 643 600 
Average number of incriminat-
ing intercepted communica-
lions_~-~- __ ____ --- - -- _____ 98 265 296 399 303 
Number of authorizations whore cost reported __ __ ______________ 120 262 
Average cost where cost re-
569 716 805 
ported. ____ __ __ ------ ---- - $1,358 $2,634 $5,534 $4,599 $5,435 
Number of orders costing: 
$1,000 or less __ ________ ______ 75 127 178 241 206 
$1,001to $2.000 . •••. •• ••••.•• 21 45 88 163 156 
$2.001to ss.ooo ____ ______ ____ 18 54 139 162 185 
$5,001to $10.000______ _____ __ 6 24 88 114 124 $10,001 and over __ __ __ __ ___ ______ ______ 12 76 96 134 
' NA-Not available. 
EXHIBIT 4 
KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES PROSECUTED UNDER FEDERAL ANTIGAMBLING LAWS, 1971- 721 
Name District 
Indictments, 1971: 
Michael Astarita •.• - -- ------- - ------ - D.N.L ..•.• 
Gaetano Musto •--- --- --- ------ -------- ·------ - -- -
Arthur Belli • - ------- -- --- - -------- - D.N.L •..•. 
Anthony Astore •- ----- --- ------- ---- ------ -------
Raflael Sabbato •-- --- --- ________ .• ---- ____ --- ----
Eugenio Stephano Campo' (U.S. v. D.N.L •..•. 
Nicholas Nardone. et al.) • 
Frank Joseph Caracci'- --- ---- --- ----- E.D.la ----
Vincent J. Marcello'-- - ---- -----------------------
Salvadore J. Marcello • (U.S. v. Baily - -- -- -- -- --
Comments 
N~~,~~~lvella •------- --- --·---- --- - W.O.Mo . . .. Boss of the Kansas City Syndicate. 
:~at~~?o!~:~~~ -~~~~~~~-~ . : : : : :::::::::::::::::::: . 
Joseph Colombo, Sr.•.-------- -- -- ---·- E.O.N.Y. __ _ Boss ofthe BroklynSyndicated· Colom-
bo has been mcapacitate by an 
assassin's bullet 
Thomas Amato •--·-- -- -- --- ----- - --------------- -
Albert Di Stephano•- -- -· -- --------·- - S.D.Ohio __ later committed suciide. 
Jack Herman • (U.S. v. Sam Winer, et S.D. Fla ••• •• 
al.) 
John James LaGorg11 • (U.S. v. Irwin W.D.Pa 
Charles A1er. et al.) 
Joseph Louis Lanza • -- --- ------- --- N.O.Ra. --- . . • 
John Nardi •- --- -- -- ----· --- -· -·----- N.D.Oh1o • •• Nard1 and Delsanter are h1gh-rankrn1 
members of the Cleveland Syndi-
cate. 
Anthony Delsanter• (U.S. v. Joseph --·---- -- - ---
James Lanese. et al.) 
Frank Thomas Narducci • --·--- ---- - E.D.Pa ••• •• 
Louis Ruggirello • - ------- - ---- --- -- E.D.Mich __ _ 
Anthony lmbrunone •------- -- - ---------------- ---
1 This list does not Include persons who have been acquitted or persons whose convictions 
have been reversed on appeal. 
• Persons named in the same indictment are listed together. 
• Case involved utilization of court-ordered eleetronic survelllanee. 
• Case involved both the ·utilization of court-ordered surveillance and a violation of 
18 u.s.c. 1955. 
~-· 
Name District Comments 
John. Pa5quale Tronolone 1 (U.S. v. S.O. Aa ••••. 
Dade Marder. etal.) 
Indictments. 1972: 
Frank Cerone~---- --- - --- -- - --- --- --- N.D.III ___ _ _ 
)llexander "Pope Oee" Dalessio I -- --- E.D.N.Y •• . • 
Henry Tratlicante •------·- -------- - -- - M.D.Ra ____ Boss of the large Florida Syndicate. 
Peter Valente • (U.S. v. Ernest Mario, S.O.N.Y - - --
et al.) 
Convictions 1971: 
Samuel Riuo Oe Cavalcante •------- --- D.N.L . -- -- Boss of the New Jersey Syndicate. 
Charles Majuri ' --- ------- --- ------ ---------- ---- -
Joseph Ippolito • -- --- -- -- -------- -- ------ ---- ---
Anthony Oe Pasque• - - -- ------ --- · - -- ------ --- --
Alessio Barrasso'-- - ------ -------- -- ---- ---- ---- -
Nick Zarro • - ----- - ---- ------------ -- -- -- ----- --
Ralph Masciola •----- -- ---- -------- --- --- ---- -- ---
Joseph Anthony Ferrarra •- - ----- --- ---------------
Pasquale Monzelli •- --- -- -------- -- --- E.D.Pa _____ . 
James Michael Pignetti - ---- --- ----- S.O.N.Y .••. 
Nicholas Ratteni (U.S. v. William Alter, S.D.N.Y - - -- High-ranking memberofthe Genovese 
et al.) Syndicate. 
Convictions, 1972: 
Nicholas Fino • (U.S. v. Joseph Fino, et W.D.N.Y •• 
al.) 
Jack Anthony Lucido -- --- ---- -- --- - E.D.Mich __ _ 
Peter Cavataio (U.S. v. Donald Dawson, ---- ------ --
et~ . 
Francis Santo (U.S. v. AI Mones, et at.) •. S.D.Fia __ __ _ 
Anthony Joseph Zerilli.. ____ ___ ________ C.D.CaliL .• Zerilli and Poliui are high-ranking 
members of the Detroit Syndicate. 
Michael Santo Poliui - ---- -- --------- ------------
Anthony Giardano • • ___ -- --- - ____ -- -- ------ -- -- ---
• Unless otherwise noted, Ute defendants listed were also the defendants named in the 
title of the indictment, e.g., the case in which Michael Astarita was prosecuted was filed 
as U.S. v. Astarita. 
• case involved utilization of 18 U.S.C. 1955. 
4. 
EXHIBIT NO. 5 
GAMBLING OPERATIONS INDICTED BY ORGANIZED CRI!IIIE AND RACKETEERING SECTION DURING FISCAL YEAR 1971 
llldidmenls Estimated annual 





440, 160, 000 
420, 565, 000 
Gamblong ondictments involving violations oilS U.S.C.l955 ____________________________________________________ __________________________________ _ 
Gambling indictmenls involving both the use of court-ordered electronic surveiOance and violations oll8 U.S.C. 1955 _______________ ~--------------------
t T:tis total includes only the indictments of gamb.ing operations doing a significant annual business; the total comprises 76 percent of the 169 indictments returned by the section during fiscal 
year 1971. • 
EXHIBIT NO. 6 - CONVICTIONS OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN MAJOR GAMBLING RINGS, FISCAL YEAR 1972 
Case 
U.S. v. William Alter, et al S.D.N.Y. 0971) _______ _ 
U.S. v. David Marder,• et at S.D. Fla. 0971) ________ _ 
U.S. v Sol Tilkin, et al. N.D. Ohio (1971) ___________ _ 
U.S. v. Raul Jimenez, et aiS.D.N.Y. 0971) _________ _ 
U.S. v. Joseph Colombo, et al. E.D.N.Y. (1971) ____ __ 
U.S. v. Petter Tenore,• ef at S.D.N. Y. (1972) ________ _ 
Numberol 
defendants 
convicted Size of operatioll 
6 Handled over $50 miDion 
annually~ 
2 Handled $150,000 a week.. 
2 Records sllowed $2110,000 busi-
ness in a 5-day period. 
7 Handled $5 million a year. 
14 Annual gross of $10 millioiL 
5 Handled $10,000 a day. 
• Court-ordered electronic surveillance used in investigating the case.. 
: Case mvolved violation ol 18 U.S.C. 1955. 
Case 
U.S. v. Vincent Cafaro ' etal S.D.N.Y. 0912) _______ _ 
U.S. w. Vincent Peter Pisacano,t et al. S.D.N. Y (1912). 
U.S. v. Earl Benton,> et at S.D.N. Y. (1972) .. --------
U.S v. Nonnan Simon,• etal. D.C. Calif (1972) _____ _ 
U.S.v. Richard Becker.'elal. S.D.N.Y. (1972) ______ _ 
U.S. v. Ronald Sacco.'elal . N.D. Calif.(l912) _______ _ 
Number of 
defendants 
convicted Size of operatioR 
4 Handled $65,000 a week. 
6 Handled $2.9 million annually. 
1 Handled $5,000 a day. 
6 Grossed $10,000 a day. 
7 Grossed approximately $125,-
000aday. 
13 Annual gross of over $15 
million. 
' Prosecution of case involved bolh the utilization of court-ordered electronic surveollance and a 
violation ol 18 U.S.C. 1955. 
/ ) 
\ '· 
15 August 1973 
Justice Powell: 
You will find attached a draft of Part I of my memorandum 
on Robinson and Gustafson. I intend to address the exclusionary 
rule in Part II.--since the two Parts address e~sily severable 
questions, I thought you mi&ht wish to see Part I at this time. 
You will also find enclosed the briefs filed in Gustafson. 
With the exception of the amicus brief filed by the state of · 
Illinois, ~ these papers do not address the exclusionary rule 
issue. I understand that that subject is discussed in the 
Robinson briefs, which you now havcS~in Richmond. When you 
have finished re _ ing them, pleaseASally to send them to me. 
JCJjr 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: JCJ jr 
RE: No. 72-936, United States v. Robinson 
No. 71-1669, Gustafson v. Florida 
Introduction 
!/ 
United States v. Robinson. 
On 19 Apri11968 Officer Jenks stopped Robinson's car for 
a "routine spot check" and examined Robinson's car registration, 
draft card, and temporary operator's license. On later reviewing 
his notes of the encounter, Jenks noticed a substantial discrepancy 
in the information Robinson had provided. A check of police traffic 
records revealed that Robinson's driver's license had been revoked 
and that Robinson had obtained a temporary operator's permit by 
fraud. 
When Jenks next spotted the car, he stopped it, arrested 
Robinson, and made the full field search required by D. C. police 
regulations for an in-custody arrest. In a pocket of Robinson's 
outer clothing, Jenks found a wadded-up cigarette pack containing 





A Florida policeman stopped Gustafson's car because it 
was "weaving" back and forth across the center line. Gustafson 
was asked to produce his driver's license. When he could not do 
so, the policeman arrested him and undertook a thorough search. 
He discovered a cigarette pack with two marijuana cigarettes. 
These cases raise two important questions. First, what ..__ 
search is permissible incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic 
violation? Second, assuming some 4th Amendment violation, is 




The 4th Amendment Right -- Search Incident to Arrest 
cv~~ f ~ 's c~l-~1~) 
The vast majority of all searches made today are justified ~~ 
, ; ~~ -r .y~.L.LK ~ 
under the exception to the warrant requirement for searches uv-...... 
~~ 
The rationale for this exception lies rl~·~ 1 
~/ 
incident to lawful arrest. 
partly in the demands of necessity and partly in the belief that 
the arrest rather than any subsequent search constitutes the --
significant intrusion of state power into an individual's privacy. 
::.;..---
!Aft..'"'"' 




An individual who has suffered the humiliation and inconvenience of _ ..... , 
arrest, so the argument runs, no longer retains any significant 
expectation that his person will be free from governmental inter-
ference. Under this line of reasoning, the validity of the search 
depends only on the strength of the state's justification for the 
initial intrusion, the arrest. 
Both the D. C. Circuit in Robinson and the intermediate 
4/ 
state appellate court in Gustafson- rejected the broad thrust of 
this argument in favor of a more discrete inquiry into whether a 
.v 
particular arrest renders a subsequent search reasonable. 
Specifically, these courts concluded that arrest for a crime 
4. 
normally involving no physical evidence (notably traffic offenses 
and such status offenses as vagrancy) justifies at most only a 
"patdown" or weapons frisk of the arrestee. Although the cases 
are similar, Robinson depicts the key considerations in somewhat 
sharper relief. 
Before exploring the merits of the Robinson decision, it 
may be helpful to state explicitly what is not at issue in these cases . ......__ 
Neither Robinson nor Gustafson is an auto search case. Both involved 
evidence found on the person. Of course, most people arrested for 
traffic offenses will be apprehended while in vehicles, but this fact 
is analytically inconsequential. Robinson would present exactly the 
same issue if, on discovering the fraudulently obtained operator's 
permit, Officer Jenks had gone directly to Robinson's home and 
arrested him there. Correspondingly, the car search question --
how to apply Chimel to an automobile -- is not limited to traffic 






Judge Wright's opinion for the Robinson plurality rests on 
the fundamental premise that the scope and intensity of a search are 
limited by the justification therefor. Robinson carries this premise 
beyond the precedents of this Court. The most direct support is found 
7/ 
in Peters v. New York.- There the Court upheld the search of a 
burglary suspect as incident to a lawful arrest and made the additional 
observation that the search was "reasonably limited in scope": 
Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained 
and thorough- going examination of Peters and his 
personal effects. He seized him to cut short his 
flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons. Y 
Despite these remarks, the law is more accurately described as a 
9/ 
"categorical" rule- allowing a full search of any person lawfully 
-~ _.....__ -
arrested for any crime. In his separate concurrence to Peters, Mr . 
. Justice Harlan was quick to note that the Court's remarks about the __....___ 
intensity of Officer Lasky's search did not reflect his understanding 
of the law: 
The second possible source of confusion is the 
Court's statement that "Officer Lasky did not engage 
in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination of 
Peters and his personal effects. " . . . Since the 
Court found probable cause to arrest Peters, and 
since an officer arresting on probable cause is entitled 
to make a very full incident search, I assume that this 
ismere y a factual observation. 10 1 
7. ' 
appellants' convictions but added a vigorous and thoughtful statement 
of the position later adopted by the Robinson plurality. Taken as a 
whole, this group of precedents is far from conclusive. They voice ---
a widespread and very real concern over the potential for an intolerable 
invasion of privacy, but analytically they add little to the line of 
precedents relied on most heavily by Judge Wright --the stop-and-
frisk cases. 
--- 14 I 15 I 
Robinson is founded on Terry v. Ohio- and Sibron v. New York.-
There this Court recognized that street encounters between policemen 
and citizens are often hostile and sometimes dangerous. The Court 
concluded that a rule allowing an officer to search a suspect only if 
he arrests him would subject the police to unnecessary and unjustifiable 
danger of injury from a concealed weapon. The Court held that a 
policeman might lack probable cause to arrest but have some legitimate 
reason to stop a suspect and detain him temporarily for questioning. 
If he has reasonable grounds to believe that that suspect might be 
armed and dangerous, the policeman may engage in a weapons frisk 
designed to locate and uncover concealed weapons. 
Thus, the Terry "patdown" came into existence as a new 
term in the lexicon of the 4th Amendment. Although both a search 
and a patdown are governed by the same general principles, they 
6. 
And in an earlier decision, Judge Wright noted with palpable distaste 
the wide acceptance of the doctrine that a lawful arrest justifies a 
full search of the person of the arrestee: 
The idea that a warrantless search incident to a lawful 
arrest always satisfies the Fourth Amendment's require-
ment of reasonableness has become a virtual shibboleth, 
unthinkably repeated by the courts.!.!/ 
In~~ has this Court held inadmissible e~ found on the person 
1 
( 
of one lawfully placed under arrest. --
In the instant case, however, Judge Wright cites a long list 
of federal and state decisions in support of the proposition that "a 
police officer has no right to search either the person or the vehicle 
incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a mere motor vehicle 
~/ -
regulation~'- The federal decisions, at least, are not so persuasive ------- ~ 
as Judge Wright suggests. Many of the cases really concern searches 
of cars rather than people. Many of them involve situations in which 
the police clearly had probable cause to search, and the courts, 
upholding the searches, worry aloud about the potential for abuse 
in allowing a full search of both car and person incident to the arrest 
of the driver for a minor traffic violation. Judge Wright singles 
out as his strongest supporting authority just such a case. In 
13 I 
United States v. Humphrey- a panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
8. 
are different animals. A full search entails the most minute exami-
nation of the suspect's person and clothing and, in the case of search 
incident to arrest, of the area within the suspect's reach. The 
patdown is only a weapons frisk. On the other hand, a search must 
be conducted pursuant to a warrant or justified under one of the 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the case of 
a search incident to arrest, the officer must know "facts sufficient 
to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing 
16 I 
a crime .... "- The patdown, however, is available incident to 
a reasonable stop if the policeman has some indication that the 
suspect may be armed. 
Judge Wright does not believe that every forcible stop or 
even every arrest warrants a weapons patdown. He would permit 
the officer to frisk only "when there exist special facts or circum-
stances which give the officer reasonable grounds to believe that 
17 I 
the person with whom he is dealing is armed and presently dangerous."-
r 
Ju~ Wright analogized the 'f outine traffic arrest to a forcible stop. 
In those situations, the policeman must have some objective indication 
that the suspect or arrestee is armed in order to undertake a limited 
weapons search. But the Robinson plurality also recognized that the 
justification for a Terry patdown could also be found in the character 
9. 
and duration of the encounter between cop and civilian. If the officer 
takes an arrestee into his custody, his exposure to danger if the 
arrestee is armed is very great. Therefore, Judge Wright concluded 
- lt/flllll"' -
th~~ody arrest always justified a weapons frisk. { ,£,;cf ~ a.. ~~ 
The core of Wright's opinion is the application to searches 
incident to arrest of the reasoning developed by the Supreme Court 
in the related but distinct circumstance of the stop-and-frisk. Neither; H • , 
dMt. /-f~M_f<~ 
Terry nor Sibron involved an arrest. Peters did. The issue raised 
by Robinson and Gustafson is whether the "search" incident to arrest 
for a traffic offense is a full search or, at most, a Terry patdown. 
Judge Wright's answer proceeds logically from the reasoning 
of Terry. The two possible justifications for a warrantless search 
are (1) protecting the police from injury from concealed weapons, 
and (2) preventing the suspect from concealing or destroying evidence 
in his possession. Most traffic offenses involve no physical evidence 
~/ 
which would be concealed on the person. Therefore, a search 
incident to arrest for such an offense serves no evidentiary function 
with respect to that crime. Stated another way, arrest for a traffic 
1 offense normally does not constitute probable cause to search the 
arrestee for evidence of that offense. The protective function of the 
search is fulfilled by a Terry patdown. Therefore, the 4th Amendment 
10. 
limits the police to a weapons frisk, the least intrusive means of 
satisfying the only legitimate rationale in the circumstances. 
The argument of the Robinson plurality can also be phrased 
more dramatically. Although he never says it this way, Judge 
Wright's analysis calls for the abolition of "incident to lawful arrest" 
as an independent doctrinal justification for a warrantless search. 
In every custody arrest, he will have ample authority to frisk for 
weapons. But as Terry and Sibron make plain, justification for a 
patdowJl does not depend on the fact of arrest but on the character 
of the encounter between cop and civilian. A forcible stop involves 
considerably less invasion of personal privacy than an arrest. As 
the greater intrusion, arrest requires the greater justification. In 
every factual context in which an officer has probable cause to arrest, 
he will have more than reasonable grounds to stop the potential 
arrestee. If he has additional grounds to believe the arrestee is 
armed, he can engage in a Terry patdown. This is true whether or 
not he actually makes an arrest. Permitting a patdown in every 
custody arrest does not reveal reliance on the fact of arrest but only 
recognition of the danger of long and close contact with a suspect who 
just might be armed. 
11. 
Under Robinson, the fact that a policeman does make an I 
~est, ~n a custody a;::;st, does net entitle him to go further than } 
a frisk. Justification for a full search arises not from the fact of 
arrest but from an independent determination of probable cause 
19 I 
and exigent circumstances.- The latter requirement will always 
be met by the potential ability of an arrestee to conceal or destroy 
evidence on his person. In most cases, the former requirement will 
be satisfied by the same underlying facts that constitute probable 
cause for arrest. The Robinson plurality identifies two categories 
of crimes which lack the usual coexistence of probable cause to 
arrest and probable cause to search. A reasonable belief that a 
20/ 
suspect committed a traffic offense- or a status crime does not 
mean that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds for an 
evidentiary search. The nature of those crimes is such that a 
search would have no evidentiary function. This line of analysis -
reduces the once conclusive impact of the phrase "incident to a 
lawful arrest" to a mere shorthand reference to those situations 
in which the police happen to have both probable cause to arrest and 
probable cause to search. 
All in all, Robinson casts some long shadows. One big question 
is whether the Robinson analysis can be successfully articulated in 
12. 
terms of categories of crimes. Robinson would cover most traffic 
offenses, but driving under the influence of either alcohol or drugs 
is an exception. An officer making an arrest for this offense would 
have probable cause to search the arrestee for evidence. Judge 
Wright notes that some status offenses, e. g. , vagrancy, also come 
21/ -
within the terms of this analysis.-- Yet the Robinson reasoning 
really has nothing to do with the categorization of offenses but with 
whether, in a particular case, an arresting officer had probable 
cause to undertake a full evidentiary search. What about arrests 
for offenses committed some time previously? If, some six months 
after the crime, a policeman spots a man believed to have been 
involved in a theft of color televisions, does that cop have probable 
cause to search the arrestee? Absent some remarkable new advance 
by the Japanese, he will not have a TV concealed on his person. The 
probability that he will be carrying burglar's tools, for example, 
or gloves used in the theft is no higher than if he were illegally 
stopped and searched for being a "known" criminal. The point is 
this: Although Robinson was conceived as an answer to the problem 
of searches incident to arrest for traffic offenses, its logic is not 
so limited. Taken at its flood tide, Robinson demands an independent 
evaluation of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest, 
--- ~ zawe-t .......... --.. ___.. 
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regardless of whether probable cause may fail because of the 
~ ~ ~---------------------------
character of the crime or the passage of time or perhaps even 
~---~ -._........- ~ 
the context of the arrest. 
The Robinson decision casts unsettling implications in other J 
directions as well. strict adherence to the principle that a search 
may be only so broad as the justification therefor led the plurality 
to assert that containers should be confiscated but not opened. Any 
enclosed weapon is thereby removed from the arrestee's grasp, but 
any evidence remains unrevealed. 
Lastly, acceptance of Robinson would greatly increase the 
pressure to limit predetention inventory searches. The police 
inventory prisoners' clothes and personal effects in order to prevent 
certain items from being introduced into the jails and to protect 
themselves against claims of loss and theft. These goals could be 
as effectively attained by allowing prisoners to waive any later claims 
and place their possessions in a sealed box or envelope. Thus the 
"legitimate" goals of the inventory search are satisfied but the 
exploratory element of this procedure is eliminated. The Robinson 
analysis argues strongly for this limitation of inventory searches. 
Furthermore, Robinson tends to undercut inventory searches practi-
cally as well as theoretically. In a great many cases, the opportunity 
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to inventory a prisoner's clothes and effects duplicates the search made 
incident to arrest. To the extent that the latter justification for a full 
evidentiary search is removed, the inventory search and the asserted 
rationales therefor, will come under increasingly close scrutiny. 
B. 
Hope fully, the preceding section adequately outlines the ante-
cedents and implications of Robinson. The following is a more personal 
commentary on the major choices which you now confront. 
In general, Robinson is a strong opinion. Judge Wright has 
restated the law of search incident to arrest with more sophistication 
and subtlety than has been devoted to this subject heretofore. The 
guiding principle -- that the form and scope of a search are limited by 
the justification for that search -- has undeniable appeal. Although 
Robinson is an innovation in the law, Judge Wright's reasoning is 
strongly buttressed by this Court's opinions in Terry, Sibron and 
Peters. And there is undoubtedly widespread agreement with Wright's 
1 
evaluation that a full evidentiary search incident to arrest for a simple 
traffic violation is a regrettable, perhaps intolerable, invasion of 
personal privacy. The vigor of Wright's exposition notwithstanding, 
9 ~...t s 
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Robinson raises several questions. 
the Robinson decision affords adequate protection to the police, 
~hether it announces guidelines which cops on the beat can under-
stand and follow, a~ether we are really ready to embrace the 
necessary implications of the Robinson analysis. 
Protection of the Police 
This inquiry consists of two elements: whether the Terry 
patdown should be automatically available only in cases of custodial 
arrest, and whether the officer who makes a custody arrest is sufficiently 
protected by a weapons frisk. 
The Robinson plurality analogized a non-custodial arrest for a 
traffic offense to a forcible stop as authorized and defined by Terry. 
22/ 
Each involves "merely a brief on-the-street encounter, "- and neither 
reveals any propensity for violence on the part of the suspect or arrestee. 
Having established the analogy, Judge Wright then applied his under-
standing of Terry to the context of the non-custodial arrest for a traffic 
offense. In both situations, the officer may frisk for weapons "only 
when there exist special facts or circumstances which give the officer 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he is dealing 
23/ 
is armed and dangerous. -
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Judge Wright's interpretation of Terry, while certainly not 
beyond question as a policy matter, is fairly supported by that decision. 
While Chief Justice Warren's opinion is not entirely clear on this point, 
it does include. language supporting the proposition that a policeman 
must have objective justification for a forcible stop arrl additional, 
independent justification for a frisk incident thereto. In his concurrences, 
Mr. Justice Harlan refined this reasoning. He thought a patdown auto-
matically justified when incident to a stop for suspicion of a crime of 
24/ 
violence- but not when "the suspected offense creates no reasonable 
25/ 
apprehension for the officer's safety. "-
The problem with the position taken by the Robinson plurality ~ 
~~ 
i~ that the ana~ between ~ble stop ~d a non-custodial arrest ~<t.t-c.-+ · 
for a traffic offense is far from exact. Usually, the traffic offender 
will be apprehended while in a vehicle. A car or truck provides many 
opportunities for concealing a weapon. Even a routine traffic arrest 
results in an encounter of some duration. If the offender remains in 
his own car, he may have an opportunity to retrieve a hidden weapon 
without being observed by the officer standing outside the vehicle. If, 
on the other hand, the policeman requires the arrestee to sit in the 
patrol car while being questioned, he can prevent him from reaching 
any weapon concealed in his car but the officer is then in such close 
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proximity to the arrestee that he is exceedingly vulnerable to attack 
with a weapon concealed on the person. Judge Wright is undoubtedly 
correct in noting that commission of a traffic offense indicates no 
propensity to violence, but if the traffic offender is in fact armed 
and dangerous, the policeman's exposure to risk will be significantly 
greater than in the case of an on-the-street cop. In my opinion, the 
arresting officer should be allowed to frisk for weapons whenever he 
feels the need to do so. I would not restrict the availability of this 
procedure to custody arrests and those situations in which the 
officer has some objective indication that the arrestee is armed. 
The second question is whether a weapons frisk is sufficient 
protection for the officer who takes the arrestee into custody. The 
dissenters in Robinson argued that the policeman's removal of a 
crumpled cigarette pack and discovery of the heroin capsules contained 
therein were legitimate aspects of a routine protective search. Officer 
Jenks felt an unidentified small object in Robinson's pocket: 
Even after Jenks was able to feel the size and texture 
of the cigarette pack inside the pocket, his remaining 
uncertainty was legitimate. He could have squeezed the 
pack while it was still in Robinson's pocket. But all that 
would have told him was that the "objects" inside were 
definitely not cigarettes. The possibility remained that 
they were any number of harmful objects, from small 
blades to live bullets. That possibility is exactly what 
the routine protective search procedure was designed 
to eliminate. 
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Yet a majority of theCA concluded that Jenks' actions could not be 
justified as a Terry patdown. This seems correct. An officer standing 
on the street with a stopped suspect is probably vulnerable only to 
attack with weapons that can be easily identified by a frisk. He runs 
no substantial risk that a suspect, while under his surveillance, will 
reach into his pocket, remove a cigarette pack, take from it some 
small but lethal weapon, and attack the policeman. If, on the other 
hand, the officer arrests the suspect, takes him into custody and trans-
ports him to a police station, his vulnerability is significantly increased. 
In Terry, the Supreme Court made reference to the following 
description of a frisk. 
[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every 
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search 
must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, 
waistline and back, the groin and area around the 
testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down 
to the feet.26/ 
Apparently, the patdown is a rather thorough procedure. Judge Wilkey's 
contention that every small bulge discovered by a frisk must be fully 
investigated is not without force. On balance, however, I am persuaded 
that the risk that an arrestee would have on his person a weapon so 
cleverly concealed that its presence could not be discovered by a frisk 
is negligible. I am also convinced that had Officer Jenks been trying 
to uncover weapons and only weapons, he would have had little difficulty r 
in determining that a wadded-up cigarette pack containing 14 capsules 
posed no threat. 
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standards for Police Conduct 
The Robinson dissenters argued strenuously against discarding 
a settled and easily understandable standard for police conduct in favor 
of an approach requiring cops in the field to make distinctions of 
considerable subtlety: 
Judge Wright's opinion throughout is based on a 
subjective a_pproach, i. e. , whether the officer actually 
felt fear and acted on that in making the search. In so 
doing, I submit Judge Wright interjects the Terry 
requirements for a "stop and frisk" into a full custodial arrest 
situation, which is quite different, and which I urge can best 
be handled by a more objective, standardized routine 
approach. I say "best, " and I mean "best"for society, 
the officer, and the individual apprehended. 27/ 
Judge Wright's approach is not entirely subjective, but it does place a 
heavy burden on the policeman in the field. The officer who arrests 
someone for a routine traffic offense may experience some vague 
feeling of apprehension. After Robinson he will wonder whether he 
could successfully explain that feeling in terms of objective indicia 
that the arrestee might be armed and dangerous. Uncertain of how 
reasonable his perceptions will appear to a reviewing court, the 
policeman may choose to take the arrestee into custody whenever, 
for whatever reason, he wishes to frisk for weapons. To some extent, 
therefore, the protection to the arrestee supposedly afforded by the 
Robinson plurality may be illusory. Theoretically, of course, a 
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policeman now makes precisely this evaluation every time he stops 
a suspect on the street. Robinson, however, vastly increases the 
frequency with which a cop must decide whether he has reasonable 
grounds to believe a suspect armed and dangerous and correspondingly 
expands the occasions on which reviewing courts must try to second-
guess police decisions. 
If the officer concludes that he does have reasonable grounds to 
believe a traffic offender might be armed and dangerous, or if he 
takes the arrestee into custody, he is entitled to engage in a Terry 
patdown. Suppose he feels a small lump in the arrestee's pocket. He 
must decide whether it might be a weapon of some sort. If he takes the 
commands of Robinson faithfully, the frisk will not be a rapid and 
entirely routine procedure but may involve some very delicate judg-
ment calls. The policeman now makes these same decisions whenever 
he frisks a suspect incident to a lawful stop, but the two situations are 
not entirely comparable. The officer who plans to take an arrestee into 
custody and rides with him to the stationhouse may be considerably 
more apprehensive about the retention by the arrestee of small, 
seemingly insignificant objects. This increased concern is likely to 
result in more borderline decisions necessitating judicial review. The 
instant case illustrates how reasonable men, even reasonable judges, 
22. 
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can differ over what an arresting officer could reasonably conclude 
might be a weapon. 
Lastly, quite apart from deciding how to apply Robinson, 
the policemen in the field may face the not inconsiderable diffi-
culties of deciding when to apply Robinson. This point was aptly 
made by the D. C. Court of Appeals. On almost identical facts, that 
court rejected both the Robinson result and the reasoning behind it: 
We thus perceive no justification for applying 
Terry standards to a situation involving a valid arrest. 
Further, analytically there is no basis for limiting the 
Robinson majority's thinking to a custodial arrest for 
a "traffic" offense. [T]he rationale of Robinson readily 
may be expanded to apply to numerous crimes which 
technically may be free of fruits or instrumentalities. 
To make the nature of the offense the key to whether a 
full search may be undertaken as part of a valid arrest 
inevitably would be to create still another judicial morass, 
and would greatly complicate the day-to-day performance 
of the police officer's vital duties. 28/ 
An Alternative to the Robinson Analysis 
If you doubt the wisdom of the Robinson decision, you may be 
interested in this brief statement of an alternative view. This line 
of reasoning begins with a statement of the role of the 4th Amendment --
to prevent unwarranted governmental intrusions into areas of an 
individual's life about which he entertains legitimate expectations of 
23. 
privacy. Whatever the ancillary consequences of this constitutional 
guarantee, its purpose was not to allow those who have committed 
crimes to avoid being found out, but rather to shield innocent citizens 
from unjustifiable invasions of privacy in the name of law enforcement. 
But respect for privacy has its costs. Presumably, observance of the 
4th Amendment's guarantee of privacy prevents the police from using 
some very efficient methods of uncovering crime. 
The alternate to Robinson rejects the fundamental assumption 
underlying that decision -- the notion that an individual has an incremental 
interest in privacy. Under this view, the arrest is the significant 
intrusion of state power into the realm of individual affairs normally 
termed private. Assuming the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest 
b 
guarded,.Jhe 4th Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and over-
riding governmental interest. At that point the arrestee retains no 
significant interest in the privacy of his pers en. Therefore; there 
exists no reason to hamper law enforcement by requiring some inde-
pendent justification for a search incident to a lawful arrest. Under 
but is, rather, an independent doctrinal exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
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This view has been well stated by the Ninth Circuit in 
Charles v. United States: 
Power over the body of the accused is the essence of 
his arrest; the two cannot be separated. To say that 
the police may curtail the liberty of the accused but 
refrain from impinging upon the sanctity of his pockets 
except for enumerated reasons is to ignore the custodial 
duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody 
must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever the 
arrested party has in his possession at the time of appre-
hension. Once the body of the accused is validly subjected 
to the physical dominion of the law, inspections of his 
person, regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed 
unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of reason 
either because of their number or their manner of 
perpetration. 29 I 
Two points about the Charles decision deserve mention. First, it 
pre-dates Terry. Although Terry does not speak directly to the issue 
of search incident to arrest, at the highest level of generality Terry 
and Charles are inconsistent. Second, the court in Charles was 
obviously contemplating a custody arrest. ---
One way to address the problem of full searches incident to 
traffic violations is to focus on whether the arresting officer took 
the offender into custody. The arrestee who is merely issued a 
summons need not go to the stationhouse. Mter a brief local detention, 
he may proceed on his way. His privacy interest has not been 
substantially eliminated by the fact of arrest if the police do not 
assert custody and control over his person. Therefore, it would 
25. 
not be illogical to require that the police have an independent justifi-
cation for a search incident to a non-custodial arrest. 
This line of reasoning would require that Robinson be reversed. 
That case involved a fairly serious offense for which District police 
regulations require a custody arrest. Therefore, a full evidentiary 
search was justified. Gustafson would require somewhat different 
treatment. The cases establish that an arrest which is merely a 
30/ 
pretext for an incidental search is invalid. - Acceptance of the 
proposition that only a custodial arrest justifies a full evidentiary 
search might suggest that a driver who was taken into custody for 
a traffic offense for which summonses are routinely issued should 
1-t: 
have an opportunity that he was placed under custodial arrest as a 
pretext for the incidental search. Clearly this would be hard to 
establish, and the remedy would only be available in extreme cases. 
) Gustafson could be remanded to afford that petitioner an opportunity 
\ to make this showing. Of course, police regulations frequently provide 
which traffic offenses warrant custodial arrests and which do not. 
Additionally, there are informal pressures against making unnecessary 
custodial arrests. The officer who takes into custody a violator of 
the most mundane traffic regulation and conducts a full evidentiary 
26. 
search may well leave himself open to the charge of pretext. These 
caveats notwithstanding, limiting full searches to custodial arrests 
is largely an illusory reform. Perhaps the ultimate question is (' 
how closely you wish to circumscribe police conduct. 
27. 
II. 
The 4th Amendment Remedy - The Exclusionary Rule 
The government urges the abandonment of exclusion of the 
evidence as the required remedy for every violation of the 4th amendment:. 
In determining when to exact the drastic remedy of 
exclusion of reliable and probative evidence of 
guilt, it is appropriate to distinguish those searches 
that are reasonably motivated and are unlikely to be 
deterred ... from sea3cbes that involve flagrant 
and willful violations. _]/ 
In essence, the SG endorses the A. L. I. proposal to suppress illegally 
obtained evidence only in instances of flagrant and substantial violations 
of the 4th amendment: 
A motion to suppress evidence shall be granted 
only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is 
based was substantial, or if otherwise required in the 
Constitution of the United States or of this State. In 
determining whether a violation is substantial the court 
shall consider all the circumstances, including: 
(a) the importance of the particular interest 
violated; 
(b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; 
(c) the extent to which the violation was willful; 
(d) the extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(e) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent 
violations of this Code; 
28. 
(f) whether, but for the violation, the things 
seized would have been discovered; and 
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced 
the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to 
defend himself in the proceeding in which the things 32/ 
seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him. 
The fate of this proposal may well be the most important question 
before the Court this Term. 
A 
Acceptance of the A. L. I. proposal involves a dramatic repudiation 
of precedent. Exclusion of illegally seized evidence has been required in 
33/ 34/ 
federal courts since 1914 and in state courts since 1961. - The 
35/ 
rule has been followed without exception to this date. 
The threshold problem is to identify the precise analytical basis --
for the rule. The A. L. I. proposal necessarily depends on the 
assumption that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not a constitutional --
right of the criminal defendant but rather a rule designed to deter police 
misconduct and effectuate the guarantee of the 4th amendment. No case 
has compelled this Court to choose between these two views of the rule, 
and the opinions speak both of controlling police behavior generally and in 
more normative terms of the need to "preserve the judicial process 
36/ 
from contamination." These highly moralistic pronouncements are 
not, as some imply, inevitably inconsistent with the A. L. I. proposal. 
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The idea that suppression of illegal evidence is required to avoid corruption 
of the judicial process surely does not contradict the A. L. I.'s attempted 
distinction between good faith error and flagrant and willful disregard 
of the 4th amendment's guarantee. The courts would scarcely embrace 
the taint of corruption by admitting evidence seized unlawfully but in a 
good faith effort to comply with the substantive rules of search and 
seizure. 
The A. L. I. position, however, is irreconcilable with the view 
that exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is a constitutional right 
and therefore personal to the criminal defendant rather than a consti-
tutionally required remedy designed to effectuate 4th amendment rights 
generally. Under this view a piece of evidence is suppressed not so 
much to contribute to a general policy of deterrence but because exclusion 
is the only adequate remedy for this particular 4th amendment violation. 
In other words, the defendant has a personal right to exclusion of Nt> -
illegal evidence. This is what commentators mean when they speak 
of a normative justification for the rule. 
The trouble with this theory is its sheer extravagance. The 7 
criminal defendant who successfully moves to suppress evidence taken I 
from him in an unlawful search is not simply returned to the status 
quo ante. Before the illegal police action, he had some potential 
criminal liability. After suppression of the evidence he will sometimes --
notably for possession offenses -- have de facto immunity from prosecution. 
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This result is difficult to justify in terms of that individual's right 
to be free from unreasonable governmental invasions of privacy. The 
fact that a policeman searched a man unlawfully does not make that man's 
37/ 
possession of narcotics any the less illegal. 
Whatever the merits of the choice between the normative and 
factual justifications for the exclusionary rule, the weight of modern 
38/ 
opinion clearly inclines toward the latter view. More to the point, 
you have already taken a position. The analysis you articulated in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante necessarily begins with the propositicm 
that a citizen whose 4th amendment rights have been violated has no 
constitutional right to suppress evidence obtained through the illegal action. 
If the criminal defendant has that right, he may assert it in any available 
forum. His claim cannot logically be denied on the ground that enforce-
ment of his rights would have only a tenuous relation to controlling 
police conduct. 
If,then, exclusion is only a remedy required to effectuate 4th 
~
amendment rights generally, it is vulnerable to the charge that it does 
not work. Under this analysis, the mandate of the Constitution hinges 
on the efficacy of the rule. Suppression of evidence would be constitu-
tionally required (1) if no other remedy or collection of remedies effectively 
deterred police illegality and (2) if the exclusionary rule did substantially 
deter such misconduct. 
31. 
Other Remedies 
The first proposition is easily established. Virtually everyone 
agrees that whether or not the exclusionary rule works (or can work), 
nothing else does. There are, however, numerous possibilities. First, 
there are state damage actions, notably false arrest and trespass. 
Since many states do not recognize good faith as a defense, strict 
enforcement of these actions against policemen would be a catastrophe. 
Therefore, courts have erected formidable barriers to recovery -
e.~., a conclusive presumption of probable cause to arrest from 
conviction for the offense for which arrest was made. Furthermore, 
there are many other reasons for the ineffectiveness of this remedy. 
Civil suits are costly, and damages are exceedingly difficult to 
establish. A policeman may be virtually judgment proof, and municipal 
or sovereign immunity often bars recovery against his employer. 
Dean Paulsen examined state tort remedies and concluded that they should 
be available for cases of "[ al ctual injury caused by serious breaches of 
duty committed in utter disregard of proper standards of police conduct." 
-- 39/ 
[Emphasis added.l - To accomplish even this goal, significant 
reforms -- notably use of a good faith defense and relaxation of 
governmental immunity --would be needed. As for more ambitious 
goals, Paulsen counselled that we should "abandon delusions of broad 
40/ 
deterrence and substantial redress." -
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There is also a federal damage action under § 1983. This remedy 
has much the same weaknesses as state tort actions, and additionally 
the policeman may invoke the "probable cause and good faith" defense 
of Pierson v. Ray. This limitation on recovery is undoubtedly wise, V 
but it substantially vitiates any broader deterrent effect. 
Injunctions may be useful when the police department is "engaged 
in a clearly unconstitional course of conduct directed against an 
41/ 
identifiable person or class of person," but as a general deterrent 
injunctive relief clearly fails. And as for the potential deterrent effect 
of criminal sanctions, one need only note the striking absence of cases 
on the subject. .. ~· 
It is easy to establish that other available remedies do not effectively 
deter police misconduct. That ts not to say, however, that the exclusionary 
rule does a substantially better job. 
Efficacy of the Exclusionary Rule 
No one has delved more deeply into this largely factual inquiry 
42/ 
than Professor Dallin Oaks. You are familiar with his excellent 
work detailing both the evidence and the arguments. You have also 
indicated tentative interest in Oaks' conclusions: 
There is no reason to expect the rule to have any 
direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police 
conduct that is not meant to result in prosecutions, and 
there is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts any 
deterrent effect on the small fraction of law enforcement 
activity that is aimed at prosecution. What is known about 
the deterrent effect of sanctions suggests that the exclusionary 
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rule operates under conditions that are extremely 
unfavorable for deterring the police. The harshest 
criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective. It is 
the sole means of enforcing the essential guarantees 
of freedom from unreasonable arrests and searches 
and seizures by law enforcement officers, and it is a 
failure in that vital task. 
The use of the exclusionary rule imposes 
excessive costs on the criminal justice system. It 
provides no recompense for the innocent and it frees 
the guilty. It creates the occasion and incentive 
for large scale lying by law enforcement officers. 
It diverts the focus of the criminal prosecution from 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant to a trial of the 
police. Only a system with limitless patience with 
irrationality could tolerate the fact that where there 
has been one wrong, the defendant's, he will be punished, 
but where there have been two wrongs, the defendant's 
and the officer's, both will go free. This would not be 
an excessive cost for an effective remedy against police 
misconduct, but it is a prohibitive price to pay for an 
illusory one . 43 I 
Ruthlessly summarized, Professor Oaks'argument runs as 
follows. First, there is no empirical evidence that suppression of 
evidence effectively deters police misconduct. Second, reason suggests 
that the context in which the rule operates is not conducive to its 
purported function of deterrence. Invocation of this sanction does not 
punish the offending policeman in any meaningful way. As a statement 
of behaviorial norm, ,the rule must compete with an alternative view 
of the policeman's duty, a view widely reinforced by the policeman's 
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peers and superiors. Additionally, the police officer is often strongly 
motivated to engage in prohibited conduct, e.g., he may want to recover 
stolen property or to confiscate contraband and have no intention to 
prosecute. Even if policemen were more receptive to the teachings 
of the courts, Oaks argues, the judicially articulated rules governing 
police behavior are ambiguous and uncertain, and they are not effectively 
communicated to the individual law enforcement officer. Lastly, Oaks 
details the enormous costs of the rule. It does nothing for the innocent 
but lets the guilty go free. It prompts policemen to fabricate compliance 
with the dictates of the 4th amendment and gives them the opportunity 
to immunize criminal conduct by purposefully overstepping the bounds of 
legitimate police behavior. It diverts the attention of the courts and the 
accused from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, and it has 
certain untoward side effects on the criminal justice system. 
These arguments notwithstanding, there are countervailing arguments. 
In many instances, one can draw different inferences from Oaks' research. 
For example, Oaks emphasizes that the sanction of suppressing illegally 
seized evidence has negligible relevance to police conduct which is not 
directed toward acquiring evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. 
Another observer might dwell on the importance of the exclusionary 
rule in controlling police conduct which is so directed. Oaks himself 
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makes the point: 
In crimes such as homicide, where prosecution is almost 
a certainty and where public interest and awareness are 
high, the conditions for deterrence are optional and the 
exclusionary rule is likely to affect police behavior. 44/ 
Oaks also quotes Professor Skotnick, who, after an extended opportunity 
to observe police practices, concluded that "the exclusionary principle 
puts pressure on the police to work within the rules in those cases 
45/ 
when prosecution is contemplated." The glass is either half 
empty or half full. 
Another factor not emphasized by Oaks is time. Exclusion of 
the evidence has been the federal remedy for illegal police action since 
1914. This may be one of a whole variety of reasons why federal 
officers are thought to observe the 4th amendment somewhat more 
regularly than their state and local counterparts. But the rule has been 
applied to the states only since 1961. States which adopted this remedy 
before Mapp were not subject to constant policing by federal courts 
sitting in habeas proceedings. The states which did not previously 
follow the rule undoubtedly went through a slow process of revising 
standard operating procedures in light of Mapp. Gaining acceptance 
of the dictates there announced takes even longer: As Oaks admits: 
Over the long term , however, the moral and educative 
force of the exclusionary rule may wear away at the 
36. 
competing norms [for police behavior l so that the 
rule may ultimately be reinforced by a sense of moral 
obligation. ~/ 
The experience of the first decade, no matter how disappointing, does not 
establish that the rule will "ultimately" fail to deter illegal conduct. 
The simple passage of time would be relatively unimportant were 
it not for the substantial post-Mapp investment in police education: 
We know that the rise and expansion of the 
exclusionary rule has been accompanied by many 
efforts at police education. Courses in police academies, 
adult education programs for police sponsored by local 
headquarters; courses in colleges and universities 
offered to the police on the issues presented by the Fourth 
Amendment have sprung up nearly everywhere. More and 
more police leaders affirm the necessity for staying within 
the rules. More and more police departments have become 
interested in the formulation of guidelines for the officer 
on the beat who must make snap judgments. It is difficult } 9 ~~ 
not to credit the exclusionary rule for some of these 
developments. 47/ 
It is also difficult not to believe that this continuing commitment to 
the task of educating policemen to the commands of the 4th amendment 
will bear no fruit. In any event, it seems too early to abandon hope. 
The exclusionary rule may, in fact, be gaining deterrence 
capability. As Professor Oaks freely admits, we actually know precious 
little about the rule in operation. Both sides of the argument are 
- 48/ 
supported by "polemic , rhetoric , and intuition. " Given the 
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lack of established facts to restrict the free range of intuition, I 
would like to close on the most salient fault I find with Oaks' analysis. 
At one point he states: 
At the very least it can be said that in terms of the 
complexity of the rules, the area of arrest and search 
seizure is not a favorable one for a deterrent sanction to be 
effective. 49/ 
Ture enough, but is it not strange reasoning to lay the blame for the 
lack of a demonstrable deterrent effect at the doorstep of the exclusionary 
rule? Neither the suppression of evidence nor any other available 
remedy will compel policemen to comply strictly with rules that they 
cannot understand. Many court decisions make distinctions so learned 
and subtle that some lawyers are baffled by their application to various 
50/ 
factual contexts. Is it reasonable therefore to conclude that police 
failure to observe such rules is due primarily to the inability of the 
exclusionary sanction to motivate compliance? Logic suggests not. To 
the extent that the rule fails in its mission of deterrence because of 
the obscurity of the underlying substantive rules, no deterrent will 
be effective. Abandonment of the rule seems to me the counsel of 
despair. 




straightforward articulation (as in a police manual), the exclusionary 
remedy may be a powerful factor compelling its observance. For 
example, does anyone seriously doubt that Miranda has greatly changed 
police practices or question that the effect of that decision would have been 
lessened dramatically had the sanction for non-compliance not been 
exclusion of the illegal evidence? Chimel is an example of a 4th amtendment 
decision that has been widely understood and followed. At least outside 
the context of a car, the teaching of Chimel is reasonably clear - the 
police may not search the entire premises or even the whole room but 
only the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach. 
Borderline questions assuredly arise, but I do not doubt that Chimel 
has substantially revised police behavior. And, I do not believe that the 
exclusionary sanction has been a negligible factor in effecting that change. 
The same point can be made another way. In cataloguing the 
costs of adhering to the rule, Professor Oaks makes the following 
observation: 
W. Kitch cites a tendency to modify the content of 
the constitutional right to security from unreasonable 
search and seizure according to what can realistically 
be enforced by means of the exclusionary rule. 
"It is all a bit backward," he observes . ..§.!_/ 
39. 
I find that approach not at all backward. If a constitutional 
standard is so arcane or unrealistic that it cannot be enforced by the 
most effective available sanction, it should be junked. The 4th 
amendment was not intended merely to state an ideal. Without the ?/ 
exclusionary rule, this constitutional guarantee would be reduced to . ( 
that station. 
B 
Ostensibly, the issue before you is not whether the exclusionary 
t;u 
rule should be abandoned entirely but whether the Court should adopt 1 
the intermediate position urged by the government. The A. L. I. proposal 
distinguishes behavior flagrant and substantial 4th amendment violations 
and good faith errors resulting from ignorance or excessive zeal. One 
,.. 
might also distinguish the application of the exclusionary sanction in state 
courts from its role in federal courts or differentiate between direct 
review and collateral relief. Although any relaxation of the rule implicates 
the same basic issue, these three halfway houses do involve somewhat 
different considerations and may evoke varying responses from your 
colleagues. 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamante, you fully explored the reasons 
for distinguishing the exclusionary sanction as applied at trial or on 
40. 
direct review from its role in actions for post-conviction relief. 
There you concluded: 
Whatever the rule's merits on an initial trial and 
appeal - a question not in issue here - the case 
for collateral attack, the exclusionary rule retains 
its major liabilities while the asserted benefit of the 
rule dissolves. For whatever deterrent function 
the rule may serve when applied on trial and appeal 
becomes greatly attenuated when, months or years 
afterward, the claim surfaces for collateral review. 
The impermissible conduct has long since occurred, 
and the belated wrist slap of state police by federal 
courts harms no one but society on whom the 
convicted criminal is newly released. 
To my mind these remarks seem entirely sensible. 
Whatever the merits of an attempted distinction between the 
s~te and federal aspects of the exclusionary rule, this approach is 
52/ 
politically doubtful. It requires overruling Duncan v. Louisiana, -
- 53/ 
as well as Mapp. The public statements of the Chief Justice -
54/ 
and those of Mr. Justice Stewart - indicate that they may be inclined 
to do so. To my knowledge, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist have 
not taken public positions on the incorporation question. The stumbling 
block is Mr. Justice White, author of both Duncan and Williams v. 
Florida and foremost exponent of the theory that the 14th amendment 
incorporates a-bill of rights guarantee either totally or not at all. 
Mapp, Duncan, and Williams may well be too much for him to take on at 
one time. 
41. 
The A. L. I. position reserves the sanction of exclusion for 
"serious" cases of police misconduct. More particularly, the A. L. I. 
proposal enumerates certain criteria for determining whether illegally 
obtained evidence should be suppressed: the gravity of the violation 
of law, the flagrancy of the officer's conduct, the foreseeable deterrent 
effect, the existence of a casual link between the 4th amendment 
violation and the discovery of the evidence, and the extent to which the 
55/ 
violation has damaged the defendant's case. The result would 
be an unstructured, case-by-case application of the exclusionary 
56/ ' 
sanction. Clearly, adoption of this proposal would mean a 
considerable sacrifice of uniformity and fairness in the criminal justice 
"-..... -.yo r.{,.... .7 
system. , .~ ~, 
If you ultimately conclude that the exclusionary principle must 
be abandoned, this proposal is a useful means to that end. Politically, it 
has the appearance of a middle course. And it has the substantive virtue 
of reserving for judges opportunities to express outrage at egregious 




proposal is significantly less drastic than outright abolition. Whatever 
deterrent effect the rule has now, or might in the future acquire, would be 
42. 
undone. Mter all, those 4th amendment violations that are willful, 
flagrant, and substantial are the one class of police actions which might 
be inhibitied by other sanctions, either now or in the foreseeable future. 
In all probability, both criminal and tort liability would be limited to 
cases of extreme police conduct. It is the less dramatic violation, the 
result not of malice but of carelessness and overzeal, for which no other 
remedy exists. The rule's deterrent potential would be completely eliminated 
precisely where it is most needed. The extreme cases can be handled q 
through other means. ~ 1 ~~~ 1-o 
t' r J ,. 
From our conversation, I gather that you may be somewhat less 
sanguine than I about the benefits of the exclusionary rule. If you decide ,: / 
to abandon it, that will be time enough to consider whether you should 
endorse the precise proposal of the A. L. I. or some variation on that 
theme. I have dealt summarily with the arguments favoring abandonment 
of the rule only because I thought you were intimately familiar with Oaks' 
thesis. Although I disagree with him, I readily concede that his analysis 
is powerful and well-reasoned. I will be glad to expand on any question 




- 471 F. 2d 1082 (D. C. 
.., c) -7/.. ,~ trj 0~.3 
K ~ I 1-' :J 
Cir. 1972) (Wright, Mcuowan, 
Leventhal, Robinson; Bazelon, concurring; Wilkey, Tamm, 
MacKinnon, Robb, dissenting). 
2/ 
- 258So.2dl(Fla. 1972). 
3/ 
- See the sources cited in Judge Wilkey's opinion at note 7, 
471 F. 2d 1113. In 1966 the New York City police made 171,288 
arrests but obtained only 3, 897 search warrants. Of course, ..._____, 
the "incident to arrest" rationale never justifies a thorough search 
of a suspect's premises, Chimel v. California, and is therefore 
probably not used in cases involving extensive pre-arrest investigation. 
4/ 
- 243 So. 2d 615 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1971). 
5/ 
- The Fla. Ct. App. quoted approvingly the following state-
ment by the Ill. Sup. Ct.: 
The critical issue in each case must be whether 
the situation that confronted the officer justified 
the search. . . . A uniform rule permitting 
a search in every case of a valid arrest, even 
2. 
for minor traffic violations, would greatly simplify 
our task and that of law enforcement officers. 
But such an approach would preclude consideration 
of the reasonableness of any particular search. 
People v. Watkins, 19 I. 2d 11, 166 N. E. 2d 433 (1960). 
6/ 
- Perhaps you regard this question as resolved by Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct 2523 (1973). I have difficulty understanding 
just what Cady means. 
7/ 
- 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (consolidated with Sibron v. New York 
and reported under that name). 
8/ 
- 392 U.S., at 67. 
9/ 
- See 243 So. 2d, at 622. 
10/ 
- 392 U.S., at 77. 
11/ 
-Worthy v. United States, 409 F. 2d 1105, 1112 (D. C. Cir. 
1968) ( Fahy, Burger; Wright dissenting). 
12 I 
- 471 F. 2d, at 1104, note 37 and accompanying text. 
3. 
13 I 
- 409 F. 2d 1055 (lOth Cir. 1969). 
141 
- 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
15 I 
- 392 u.s. 40 (1968). 
161 
- 392 U.S., at 26. 
17 I 
- 471 F. 2d, at 1097. 
18 I 
- An obvious exception is driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs. An arrest for this offense would clearly justify 
a full search, even under Wright's view. 
19 I 
- Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (197i); 
Cupp v. Cady, 32 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973). 
201 
- Again note the obvious exception of drunk driving. 
211 
- 471 F. 2d, at 1108, note 47. 
4. 
22/ 
- 471 F. 2d, at 1096. 
23/ 
- Id., at 1097. 
24/ 
- 392 U.S., at 33: 
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right 
to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason 
for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a 
crime of violence. [A] limited frisk incident to a lawful 
stop must often be rapid and routine. There is no reason 
why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a 
person suspected of a serious crime should have to 
ask one question and take the risk that the answer 
might be a bullet. 
25/ 
- Id., at 74. 
26/ 
- Quoted in 471 F. 2d, at 1099. 
27/ 
- 471 F. 2d, at ll22, note 34. 
Judge Wright might allow Officer Jenks to remove a crumpled 
cigarette pack so long as he did not look inside. This too has its 
problems. The arresting officer would have to keep all envelopes, 
boxes, small packages, etc. , until he reached the stationhouse. This 
5. 
might prove cumbersome. It would clearly require some sort 
of inventory system to guard against claims of loss or theft. 
28/ 
-- United States v. Simmons, 302 A. 2d 728, 733 (1973) 
(citations omitted). 
29/ 
- 278 F. 2d 386, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1960) (citations omitted). 
30/ 
-Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 
1968) (Wisdom, Coleman concurring in the result, Godbold specially 
concurring). 
6. 
31/ Brt ef for petitioner 41. 
32/ Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure § 290. 2(2) 
(Proposed Official fraft No.1, July 15, 1970). 
33/ Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
34/ Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961X Clark, Warren, Black 
Douglas, Brennan; Black concurring; Douglas concurring; Stewart 
equivocating; Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker, dissenting). 
35/ In Davis v. Mississippi , Mr. Justice Brennan correctly 
summarized the cases: 
Our decisions recognize no exception to the rule that 
illegally seized evidence is inadmissable at trial, how-
ever relevant and trustworthy the seized evidence may 
be as an item of proof. 
394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969). Of course, the exclusionary rule, as all 
constitutional requirements, is subject to the mitigating effect of the 
doctrine of harmless error. 
36/ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J. dissenting): 
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it incites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of 
the criminal law the end justifies the means - to 
declare that the Government may commit crimes in 
7. 
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -
would bring terrible retribution against that 
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely 
set its face. 
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), Mr. Justice stewart 
dubbed this normative justification for excluding illegally seized 
evidence "the imperative of judicial integrity." Id., at 222. 
37/ Note, however, that only this view of the constitutional 
underpinnings of the rule explains Alderman v. United states, 394 
U. S. 16 5 (19 69) , and other cases dealing with standing to raise 4th 
amendment claims. Under the deterrence rationale, every criminal 
defendant who moves to suppress evidence acts to vindicate the rights 
of all citizens to be free from unwarranted invasions of privacy 
by deterring the police from similar future acts. It matters not that 
the evidence was seized, for example, in an illegal search of someone 
else's house. Alderman, however, says that a criminal defendant 
can exclude relevant evidence only if it was obtained in violation of his 
rights. Plainly, Alderman and the other 4th amendment ~tanding cases 
rest on the unarticulated assumption that exclusion is a constitutional 
right of the criminal defendant rather than a constitutionally required 
remedy, as Oaks concluded. 
8. 
38/ See D. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure, 32 Chi. L. Rev. 665, 668-72 and accompanying citations 
(1970) (hereinafter, Oaks). 
39/ Law and Order Reconsidered, A Staff Report to the National 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 575 (1969). 
40/ Id. 
41/ Id., at 380. 
44/ See note 38. 
43/. Oaks, at 755 
44/ Id., at 731 
45/ Id. 
46/ Id., at 729 
47/ Law and Order Reconsidered, a Staff Report to the National 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 368 (1969). 
48/ Oaks, at 755. Oaks dubs the concluding paragraphs which 
you quoted his own "polemic on the rule." Id. 
49/ Id., at 731. 
50/ I would cite especially the Aguilar-Spinelli-Harris series. 
51/ Oaks, at 7 4 7 (citations omitted). 
52/ 391 u.s. 145 (1968) 
53/ See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 76-77 (Burger 
C. J. , dissenting). 
9. 
54/ See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 ~seq. 
(1968) (Harlan, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting); Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78,143 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissentingandconcurring). 
55/ See Commentary to § 55290.2(2) at 221. 
56/ I strongly suspect a year's experience would reduce this 
imposing list of considerations to a <!_e facto good faith test. 
lfp/ss 8/16/73 
No . 72-936 U. S . v. Willie Robinson 
Summer Memorandum 
This case, together with Gustafson v . Florida 71-1669 
(see my separate memorandum), is on our list for special study . 
Accordingly, this memorandum will be brief and merely to refresh 
my recollection. 
Statement of the Case 
This case involves the validity of a search, with 
probable cause but without warrant, incident to the arrest for 
a traffic offense . In addition to the question whether the 
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule under situations such 
as those here involved also is briefed extensively . 
Respondent was convicted by a jury of possession and 
concealment of heroin and sentenced to eight years imprison-
ment . On his first appeal to CADC, the Court en bane remanded 
the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on 
the scope of the search of respondent's person . After such a 
hearing, in which findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were made (Appendix B, p . 8oa of petition), CADC again reheard 
the case en bane and by a 5 to 4 vote reversed the conviction. 
Officer Jenks stopped respondent ' s car on April 19, 
1968, for a routine traffic check and made notes of his driver ' s 
permit, vehicle registration and selective service classification 
2 . 
card . Discrepancies in birth dates were noted by Jenks who 
checked the 
nevertheless allowed respondent to depart . Jenks subsequent ly/ 
police recordsand discovered that respondent ' s permit had been 
revoked and that a subsequent temporary permit had been issued 
to respondent on the basis of a fradulent application . 
On April 23, and about midnight, Jenks again observed 
respondent driving with two companions and signaled him to stop . 
Jenks placed respondent under arrest and "proceeded to pat him 
down" (H . Tr . 16-17) . During the pat down, Jenks placed his 
hand "on the breastpocket on the outside of (respondent ' s) 
coat" and felt " something inside the coat which he could not 
identify ." Jenks then reached inside the pocket and pulled 
out the object which was " a crumpled cigarette package", but 
he still could not tell what was in it - except that it did 
not contain cigarettes . Upon opening the pack, Jenks found 
a 
15 capsules of heroin . He thereafter complete K:t~ " full field 
search . . . feeling around his waist and on his trouser legs 
and examining the remaining pockets . " (H . Tr . 21) 
The crime of operating a motor vehicle after revocation 
is a serious one, carrying a mandatory minimum jail sentence 
of 30 days with imprisonment up to a year . The officer is 
required by police regulations to make a summary arrest, take 
the violator in custody, and book him at the stationhouse . 
Moreover, in making such a "full custody" arrest, police 
department instructions require the arresting officers to 
3. 
conduct a "full field search" . 
Question Presented 
As stated in the government ' s petition and brief 
the question is as follows : 
"Whether the Exclusionary Rule forumlated 
under the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression 
of contraband found in a cigarette pack taken from 
a suspect _during - a full search of his person for 
possible weapons, made incident to a lawful arrest 
ana pursuant to a police regulation requiring such 
searches of all prisoners . " 
Although the exclusionary rule issue apparently was 
to 
raised in the court below, and was referreq/particularly in 
Judge Wilkey ' s dissenting opinion, the principal issue 
confronted by both opinions in CADA was the lawfulness of the 
search under the circumstances . 
Opinions Below 
The majority and minority opinions do not read the 
facts the same way . Judge Wright's majority opinion states 
that " there was no suggestion that (Jenks) believed it (the 
unidentified object) to be a weapon or believed himself to be 
in danger . " Although I have not yet read the entire transcript 
of evidence, it does appear that Jenks testified that : 
" I didn't think about what I was looking for . I just searched 
him . " Judge Wilkey, for the dissenting judges, treated the 
search as a "protective one", emphasizing the hazard to police 
officers of on-the- street confrontations especially where there 
4. 
probable cause to believe that the car driver has committed 
one felon~or serious misdemeanor . 
Judge Wilkey frames the issue as being the "reasonable-
ness" of the protective routine established by the police depart -
ment (which Jenks follows) rather than the reasonableness of the 
officer's suspicion or what he may subjectively have believed . 
Judge Wright ' s opinion is an innovative and thoughtful -
if revisionist - treatise on the law of search and seizure . 
He correctly puts aside the "plain view" exception and analyzes 
this case in the framework of a Terry stop and frisk search . 
He largely disregards the widely accepted view that a full 
search incident to a lawful arrest is justified . 
In applying Terry, Judge Wright concluded that Jenks 
did not reasonab~ fear bodily harm and therefore concluded 
that the Terry exception was not applicable . 
The minority opinion, however, took quite a different 
view . It correctly pointed out that there is a distinction between 
" reasonable suspicion" for a stop and frisk (as in Terry and 
Adams), and a search incident to arrest based on probable 
cause . Judge Wilkey makes a persuasive argument that this 
5 . 
search, in the latter category, was fully justified and reasonable 
under constitutional standards . He emphasized further the 
police department regulations requiring the search, and the 
inherent danger to police officers under the circumstances 
involved . In this connection, see brief amicus filed by 
"Americans for Effective Law Enforcement" and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, especially pp. 10, 11, 12 et seq . 
Judge Wilkey focused on the "protective" nature of the search 
in accordance with prescribed police regulations . He did not 
disagree with Judge Wright's point that the purpose of this 
search was not to obtain evidence related to the offense of 
driving without a valid permit . 
Judge Wilkey makes a telling point (although in overly 
strong language) at p . 73a, 74a of the petition : 
"In Terry the Court described a permissible 
1 fri sk 1 in these terms : 
(T)he officer must feel with sensitive 
fingers every portion of the prisoner's body . 
A thorough search must be made of the prisoner ' s 
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the 
groin area about the testicles, and entire 
surface of the legs down to the feet . 
It is utterly inconceivable to me that Judge 
Wright can take this as the accepted standard 
for a permissible 1 frisk 1 - but take it they 
must b~cause this is the Supreme Court's 
standard fMXXKX~RxmXXX±RXRXX~X±XN - and yet 
hold impermissible Officer Jenks 1 search of 
the contents of the outer pocket of Robinson's 
car coat, a protective search made after 
arrest by the officer alone at 11 : 10 p .m. 
as a prelude to taking custody and transporting 
the prisoner ." (p . 73a-74a) 
.... 
6 . 
One distinction to keep in mind, which was recognized 
by both opinions with varying degrees of emphasis is that this 
was not a routine traffic arrest in which police officers 
customarily issue "tickets" or summonses, rather this was an 
arrest for driving after revocation of a permit (and in this 
case where a second permit had been obtained frauduently) . 
In these circumstances, as noted above, the officer• was 
required to arrest the suspect, bring him to headquarters and 
have him booked . The police regulation requiring a "full field 
search" is applicable only to such an arrest, and not to the 
issuance of a traffic ticket . I consider this distinction to 
be an important one . 
Exclusionary Rule 
I will not touch upon the exclusionary rule in this 
hurried memorandum bey6nd saying that the SG has " gone all out " 
to persuade the Court to adopt a modification - along the lines 
of the ALI proposal - to the present unbending, unthinking and 
arbitrary application of the exclusionary rule . It is not clear 
to me that we need to reach this issue in this case as I am 
inclined - XNXN subject to further study and conference - to 
agree with Judge Wilkey ' s anal ysis of the underlying, substantive 
issue . But if we do reach the exclusionary rul e issue, I will 
want to give serious consideration to the ALI formulat ion . 
I have looked at the proposed offici al draft No . 1 of the ALI 
7. 
Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure . This was adopted at 
the ALI spring meeting, and is now incorporated - I believe 
without change - as official draft No. 1, July 15, 1972 -
which I have not examined . 
For a discussion of the ALI Rule see p. 42 R± et seq . 
of the brief for the United States filed June 6 . See also 
the illuminating discussion by Judge Wilkey - in which he 
suggests that Judge Wright took undue liberty with the Code -
in footnote 33 to the dissenting opinion, pp . 74a-76a of 







Mr. John c. Jeffries, Jr. DATE: August 20, 1973 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 72-936 U.S. v. Willie Robinson ~~ ' i'J \ ~ 
'i: 
" Referring to our brief, preliminary discussion of 
the exclusionary rule, I enclose a copy of my "summer !•:: .. ~": ~ ,i, 
memorandum" on U.S. v. Robinson. 
I had not looked at this case when we talked, nor 
appreciated the extent to which the government now urges a 
modification (within narrow limits) of that Rule. 
\ The primary purpose of my sending you this extremely 
rough memorandum is to express my interest particularly in the 
ALI formulation -pprepared by able reporters and with a 
distinguished advisory committee (including some fairly well 
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to make a. custodial arrest.* 
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• I ;' am by no means sure that there would be probable cause tor 
arrest merely because ot the failure of' the driver to have .. a 
license, as c1rc\lll1$tancea can vary quite widely. It, for example, 
you were stopped en route to the Court one morning and h&d 
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ot identity, address and DC residency, I am not at all sure it 
would be reasonable tor an ·Officer to drag you ott to the 
pplice station and certainly not to make a fUll search • 
.. ,. . ) 
TO: Justice Powell 
I 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: August 28, 1973 
From: John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
No. 72-936 United States v. Robinson 
No. 71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida 
This is the completed draft of my summer study memo on Robinson, 
Gustafson, and the exclusionary rule. You have already seen Part I. 
Part II begins on page 2 7 . 
I look forward to returning to these cases in a more directed 





J.ir. John c. Je: f ries, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DA'i'E: August 31, 1973 
No. '7"2-936 U.S • v. Hob ins on 
No. ,Tl ... 1662 Gustafson v. . lorida. 
Hy thanks for your completed summer study :tnemo on the 
above cases and the exclusionary rule. It is an excellent memo, 
reflecting careful and thoughtful work. 
We will do some talking about these cases after I 
have l1ad an O?portunity to consider them more carefully, and 
when we are a little ~loser in to argument and decision. I 
Will confine myself now - hurriedly and perhaps more viscerally 
truu1 analytically - to a few random comments on Part II. 
1. Perhaps it is unnecessary to say, in view of 
Bustamante, that I do not regard the exclusionary rule as a 
constitutional right of the individual. I view it, rather, 
as a remedy designed to effectuate Fourth Amenrunent rights which 
has been givena measure of constitutional status by this Court. 
There is nothing in the Constitution itself~ its history, or 
the English ex erience from which we derived most of our concepts 
of personal rights of' a.ccused personal! to justify enshtining 
the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right. 
2. It is true, as lTof. Oaks conceded, that we do 
not yet k:now enough abo ·1t the exclusionary l"Ule in operation 





2 • . 
admitting to a bit of ''rhetoric 11 on both sides, the dogmatic 
rhetoric 1n some of' the opinions of the Court as to the efficacy 
of the exclusionary rttle, without benefit of evidence of any 
kidd, is hardly equaled by anything I have ae.en on the other 
side ot this argument. Moreover, if indeed deterrence 1s the 
basis ot the rule (as Justice Brennan and others have said 
repeatedly), empirical evidence 1& searecely required to know 
that in many of the situations 1n whieh the rule bas been applied 
the police could not have been deterred for the simple reasonc -
that they could not possibly have anticipated in advance how 
judges, who disagree frequently and unpredictably among the~ 
selves, will decide whether a particular search violated the 
Fourth. Except tor the general educational value of the rule 
(which hae been significant), I would be hard to convince that 
it actually deters - or indeed should deter* ... many of the 
limtted searahes made 1n good :ta:!.th under the customary exigent 
circumstances of a warrantless search. 
3. You reter, a.s an analogous situation, to Miranda 
a.e having a Wholesome etrect on law enforcement pra.ctiees. One 
m.a.y doubt whether this 1a comparable 1n view of the relative 
simplicity of enforcing the t-t ira.nda rule as compared with the 
infinite complexities and unforeseeable variations likely to 
e.xiet in search cases. Probably ever police department or any 
Wtt sanc~!ona were such as to cause police to be more teartul 
ot e. technical violation than determined to apprehend and 
convict criminals, I'm not at all sure this would be desirable. 
size in the country today complies formalistically with Miranda 
by the simple 4evice or having printed torms which are read 
routinely a.nd by rote at the 4eaignated times and places. 
Incidentally, I ha.ve observed personally this ritual when 
riding with police officers on night be&.te. 
!J., Perhaps my principal reservation with respect to 
your Part II is the extent to wh1¢h it i .ndica.tea that the basic 
choices confronting the Court (and me as an individual Justice 
keenly interested in this problem) are reduced to two: (1) 
retain the exclusionary rule in 1taatull sweep, just as it it 
were written verbatim 1n the Oonatitut.ion; or (ii) abandon it 
altogether. 
Althous;h you address several "halfway houses", you 
emphasize the problems - and ot cou.l!'se they are not imaginary -
with respect to each ot them. One of the intermediate positions, 
to which I am alr$ady committed• is the distinction between 
application of the rule at trial and on direct review, and ita 
application in post-conviction cases. On principle I would, 
as you .suggest, apply this distinction to federal as well a.a 
state post~oonviction proceedings, although the federal-state 
relationship - which doee implicate constitutional principle -
indicates a need tor gr•a.ter restraint with :respect to extending 
a tede:ral court ... made rule to state coll&.teral proceed1nga. 
I do not presently view the choice as being narrowed 





o~ the ALI position an abandonment of the exclusionary principle. 
I cannot follow you in stating that the ALI proposal is not 
significantly 1'less drastic than outright abolition! {p. 41). 
You are correct, ot course, in saying that the allowing or any -
discretion by the courts would result in a. .,case-by-case 
application ot the exclusionary sanction" and would mean a 
"sacrifice or uniformity". But this is hardly something new 
in our law, and indeed one of the principal functions of' courts 
and juries is to apply many or our trallltional rules precisely 
in this manner. 
Your draft further suggests that there would be con-
siderable sac:rifice of "fairness in the criminal justice system". 
If fairness is measured only in terms of the rights of aecused 
persona without regard to the rights of society and the societal 
interest in an effective as well as a fair system, of course, 
you would be right. But I incline to a balancing - even if 
this is left to judges on e. case-by-ease basis (as I ltnow ot 
no other way) ... of the comi,eting but legitimate interests here 
involved. 
I do not find the ALI position as "unstructured 11 as 
you do. It enumerates, as you correctly point out, certain 
standards or criteria tor determining when the extluaionary 
rule is to be &J)plied. These standards, although subject to 
interpretation and the applying of judgment in a particular 
case, are fairly specific and would provide reasonable guidelines 
to the conscientious judge. 
In suggesting that the ALI formulation would constitute 
an abandonment, you further state that the rule's deterrent 
potential would be "com~letely eliminated prtoiaely where it is 
needed most." While this is an arguable view, I a.m not yet 
persuaded. As stated above, it 1s unlikely that any rule, short 
of some drastic civil or criminal penalty on police themselves, 
will deter the good faith type of error wh1ch1he ALI would except 
from the present rule. If no one really knows how the ex~lusionary 
rule will be applied in such cases, how can one expect it to 
deter the individual policeman confronted with an emergency 
situation where he must act on his own initiative? It is the 
"substantial" violation of Fourth Amendment rights, a.s identified 
by the ALI standards, ~mich must be deterred. There is less 
risk of serious or significant infringement of the protected 
privacy or law abiding citizens in the typical ngood faith 
error" type of case. 
I agree with the observations made earlier in your 
memorandum (p. 29) to the effect that applying the exclusionary 
rule as a constitutional right (which appears to be your 
alternative to abandonment) is unprincipled because of "its 
sheer extravagance". As you perceptively note, the suppression 
of evidence does not simply return the defendant to the status 
6. 
quo ante, but rather confers on him an undeserved immunity from 
prosecution. It .strikes me that something is fundamentally 
fallacious in slavish adherence to e. rule l'thich produces such a 
bizarre result. 
The English, famed for their civilized system of criminal 
Justice and their zeal for safeguarding the rights of accused 
persons, manage to operate their system fairly and more eftectively 
than we do without an arbitrary exclusionary rule. English judges 
exercise a sound discretion basically along the lines proposed 
by the ALI in determining whether to suppress the seized evidence~ 
The English police are perhaps better disciplined than ours, and 
it is true that the English judges function in a closer relation-
ship to each other than is possible in this country. But after 
discounting these differences, it is to be remembered that we 
do have the Supreme Court which in the end will be the final 
arbiter of the application of any relaxation or the exclusionary 
rule and there is no reason to believe that this Court will 
tolerate a significant dilution of Fourth Amendment rights any 
more than tht English courts have. 
* * * * * 
As is evident from the foregoing, I instinctively 
suspect the meri·t of any rule that forecloses all judicial 
discretion and allows admittedly guilty ~erendants to go free -




the rule in accomplishing its avowed purpose. But we do not 
write on a clean slate. I would not therefore argue for the 
abolition of the exclusionary rule. I cannot a.nd do not wish 
to ignore or overturn the entire body of case law supporting 
the principle or the rule. I am searching (and greatly value 
your thoughtful assistance) as were the scholars and judges who 
drafted e.nd adopted the ALI proposal, tor a. more rational 
position than that which has evolved from the judicial process 
since 1914. 
Your thinking and questioning stimulate me to do 
likewise. Tlus is the beat way to come up with a good answer. 







Mr. John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: August 31, 1973 
No. 72-936 U.S. v. Robinson 
No. 71w1669 Gustafson v. Florida 
My thanks for your completed summer study memo on the 
above cases and the exclusionary rule. It is an excellent memo, 
reflecting careful and thoughtful work. 
t'le will do some talking about these cases after I 
have had an opportunity to consider them more carefully, and 
when we are a little &loser in to argument and decision. I 
will confine myself now - hurriedly and perhaps more viscerally 
than analytically - to a few random comments on Part II. 
1. Perhaps it is unnecessary to say, in view of 
Bustamante, that I do not regard the exclusionary rule as a 
constitutional right of the individual. I view it, rather, 
as a remedy designed to effectuate Fourth Amendment rights which 
has been givena measure of constitutional status by this Court. 
There is nothing in the Constitution itself, its history, or 
the English experience from which we derived most of our concepts 
of personal rights of accused persons, to justify enshtining 
the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right. 
2. It is true, as Prof . Oaks conceded, that we do 
not yet know enough about the exclusionary rule in operation 
to draw many positive and final conclusions. Yet, while 
-
2. 
admitting to a bit of "rhetoric" on both aides, the dogmatic 
rhetoric in some of the opinions of the Court as to the efficacy 
of the exclusionary rule, without benefit of evidence of any 
kidd, is hardly equaled by anything I have seen on the other 
side of this argument. Moreover, if indeed deterrence is the 
basis of the rule (as Justice Brennan and others have said 
repeatedly), empirical evidence is scarfcely required to know 
that in many of the situations in which the rule has been applied 
the police cpuld ~ have been deterred for the simple reasonc 
that they could not possibly have anticipated in advance how 
judges, who disagree frequently and unpredictably among them-
selves, will decide whether a particular search violated the 
Fourth. Except for the general educational value of the rule 
(which has been significant), I would be hard to convince that 
it actually deters - or indeed should deter* - many of the 
limtted searches made in good faith under the customary exigent 
circumstances of a warrantless search. 
3. You refer, as an analogous situation, to Miranda 
as having a wholesome effect on law enforcement practices. One 
may doubt whether this is comparable in view of the relative 
simplicity of enforcing the Miranda rule as compared with the 
infinite complexities and unforeseeable variations likely to 
exist in search cases. Probably evert.1police department of any y 
*!f sanctions were such as to cause police to be more fearful 
of a technical violation than determined to apprehend and 
convict criminals, I'm not at all sure this would be desirable. 
'• . . .. 
size in the country today complies formalistically with Miranda 
by the simple Jievice of having prin·ted forms which are read 
routinely and by rote at the designated times and plaees. 
Incidentally, I have observed personally this ritual when 
riding with police officers on night beats. 
4. Perhaps my principal reservation with respect to 
your Part II is the extent to which it indicates that the basic 
choices confronting the Court (and me as an individual Justice 
keenly interested in this problem) are reduced to two: (i) 
' retain the exclusionary .rule in itssfull sweep, just as if it 
·f ' 
were written verbatim in the Constitution; or (ii) abandon it 
altogether. 
Although you address several "halfway houses 11 , you 
emphasize the problems - and of course they are not imaginary -
with respect to each of them. One of the intermediate positions, 
to which I am already committed, is the distinction between 
application of the rule at trial and on direct review, and its 
application in post-conviction cases. On principle I would, 
as you suggest, apply this distinction to federal as well as 
state post-conviction proceedings, although the federal-state 
relationship - which does implicate constitutional principle -
indicates a need for greater restraint with respect to extending 
a federal court~made rule to state collateral proceedings. 
I do not presently view the choice as being narrowed 
to the two extremes you suggest. Nor would I consider adoption 
I . 
4. 
of the ALI nosition an abandonment of the exclusionary principle. 
I cannot follow you in stating that the ALI proposal is not 
significantly nless drastic than outright abolition~ (p. ~1). 
You~ correct, of course, in saying that the allowing of any 
discretion by the courts would result in a. "case-by-case 
application of the exclusionary sanction" and would mean a 
"sacrifice of uniformity11 • But this is hardly something new 
in our law, and indeed one of the principal functions of courts 
and juries is to apply many of our tra!4tional rules precisely 
in this manner. 
Your draft further suggests that there would be con-
siderable sacrifice of 11 fairness in the criminal justice system11 • 
If fairness is measured only in terms of the rights of ascused 
persons without regard to the rights of society and the societal 
interest in an effective as well as a fair system, of course, 
you l'lOuld be right. But I incline to a balancing - even if 
this is left to judges on a case-by-case baois (as I know of 
no other \'lay) - of the competing but legitimate interests here 
involved. 
I do not find the ALI position as 11unstructured11 as 
you do. It enumerates, as you correctly point out, certain 
standards or criteria for determining when the exllusionary 
rule is to be applied. These standards, although subject to 




case, are fairly specific and would provide reasonable guidelines 
to the conscientious judge, 
In suggesting that the ALI formulation would constitute 
an abandonment, you further state that the rule's deterrent 
potential would be "completely elimina.ted prllcisely where it is 
needed most.n While this is an arguable view, I am not yet 
persuaded. As stated above, it is unlikely that any rule, short 
of some drastic civil or criminal penalty on police themselves, 
will deter the good faith type of error which the ALI would except 
from the present rule. If no one really knows how the exilusionary 
rule will be applied in such cases, how can one expect it to 
deter the individual policeman confronted with an emergency 
situation where he must act on his own initiative? It is the 
"substantial" violation of Fourth Amendment rights, as identified 
by the ALI standards, l'Thich must be deterred. There is less 
risk of serious or significant infringement of the protected 
privacy of law abiding citizens in the typical "good faith 
error" type of case. 
I agree with the observations made earlier in your 
memorandum (p. 29) to the effect that applying the exclusionary 
rule as a constitutional right (which appears to be your 
alternative to abandonment) is unprincipled because of nits 
sheer extravagance". As you perceptively note, the suppression 
of evidence does not simply return the defendant to the status 
6. 
quo ante, but rather confers on him an undeserved immunity from 
prosecution. It strU:es me that something is fundamentally 
fallacious in slavish adherence to a rule which produces such a 
bizarre result. 
The English, famed for their civilized system of criminal 
justice and their zeal for safeguarding the rights of accused 
persons, rnanage to operate their system fairly and more effectively 
than we do without an arbitrary exclusionary rule. English judges 
exercise a sound discretion basically along the lines proposed 
by the ALI in determining whether to suppress the seized evidence. 
The English police are perhaps better disciplined than ours, and 
it is true that the English judges function in a closer relation-
ship to each other than is possible in this country. But after 
discounting these differences, it is to be remembered that we 
do have the Supreme Court which in the end will be the final 
arbiter of the application of any relaxation of the exclusionary 
rule and there is no reason to believe that this Court will 
tolerate a significant dilution of Fourth Amendment r:t.ghts any 
more than the English courts have. 
* * * * * 
As is evident from the foregoing, I instinctively 
suspect the merit of any rule that forecloses all judicial 
discretion and allows admittedly guilty defendants to go free -
especially when there is genuine doubt as to the efficacy of 
.~ •... ' 
• 
7. 
the rule in accomplishing its avowed purpose. But we do not 
write on a clean slate. I would not therefore argue for the 
abolition of the exclusionary rule . I cannot and do not wish 
to ignore or overturn the entire body of case law supporting 
the principle or the rule. I am searching (and greatly value 
your thoughtful assistance) as were the scholars and judges who 
drafted and adopted the ALI proposal, for a more rational 
position than that which has evolved from the judicial process 
since 1914. 
Your thinking and questioning stimulate me to do 
likewise . This is the best way to come up with a good answer. 
L.F.P. , Jr. 
ss 
' ' . 
lfp/ ss 9/26/73 2cc ------olllm,m,~ary m mo, nn!DII:recrw p at Conference 
No. 72 ... 936 u.s. v. Robinson 
No. 71-1869 Gustafson v. Florida 
This memorandum 18 limited to the first of the two major questions 
involved in these cases, namely, what search 1s permissible incident to 
a lawful arrest for a traffic Ylolatlon? 
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring 
separately) in an en banch opinion, severely llmtted the heretofore accepted 
rule that searches of an lndlvldual's person (net hls premises) tnctdental 
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. 
In Robinson it 1s conceded that there was probable cause (driving 
with a fraudulent llceJUJe) for a custodial arrest. Judge Wrlgbt developed 
his position from Ter!1 and Stbron, the "stop and frtsk" eases allowiDg 
a ''pat down" for weapons but nothing more. Judge Wright would allow 
a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a 
emdttlon to a further search .. a determlnatloo by the officer of probable 
cause or exigent circumstances. Nc:t just for the a:rrest but for a search 
which goes beyond a mere frisk. 
In substance, Wrlpt'a opinion requires an Independent evaluation 
of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest vh 1cb goes 
beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not extat 
becaue ot the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy 
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed 
sometime previously). 
I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established 
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would: 
(1) Weaken the capability of police officers to 
protect themselves when making lawful arrests. 
( 11) It depends upcm subjective judgments, made on the 
spot by the arresting officers, whtch would be difficult 1f not 
impossible to apply; 
(111) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing 
between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter 
for the scOJ)! of the particular search, Introduces possibly far 
reaching consequences into this area of the law. • 
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda 1n my 
ftle, I would reverse R.obtnson. 
••••• 
gustafson presents a more dUftcult problem. The traffic offense 
(weaving across tile center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's 
permit) certainly juetUled a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so 
held. But the tramc offenses in Gustafson were mtnor compared to 
the fraudulent driver's llceue involved In Robtnson. It could be aaue<t 
that, tn the Oastafson circumstances, a custOiltal arrest was unnecessary 
•Tiiii eourt has many times articulated as a well settled principle the 
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See e.;. , Weeks v. u.S., 
232 U.S. 883, 392; Carroll v. U.s., 287 U.S. tW,tS"S; Preston v. U:T.;" 
376 u.s. 364, 36'1; Peters v. u.s. (under the name of 81bron v. u. s:;-f92 
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. '17; Chlmel v. Ca1lfo~"3ft u.s. 
'152, 762-!l83; and CupP v. MU!Phf, deetded JiSt May 29 (see SO's brief 
pp. 16-17). 
3. 
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate. 
If I start, as I do, from the positicm. that a lawful custodial arrest 
justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the questlm remains 
open tn a particular ease as to whether a custodial arrest was tn faet 
justUled. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's oplnion In Amador-Gonzales 
v. yntted States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext 
to enable the pollee to conduct an incidental search. WhUe this milht be 
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would net neeeuarUy 
be a futUe remedy 1n extreme cases. For example, on routine traffic 
violations (e. g. running a red.Ught or making a wrong left turn) moat 
pollee departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a 
summons (absent a nonresident violator) U an officer, contrary to aueh 
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic 
violation, arguably this would be pretextual. 
I am inclined to remand Dutafsoo. to afford him an opportunity to 
show that the arrest was pretextual under the facts of his cue. 
lfp/ss 9/26/73 2cc Summary memo, prepared for possible use 
at Conference 
No. 72-936 U.S. v. Robinson 
No. 71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida 
This memorandum is limited to the first of the two major questions 
involved in these cases, namely, what search is permissible incident to 
a lawful arrest for a traffic violation? 
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring 
separately) in an en bane opinion, severely limited the heretofore accepted 
rule that searches of an individual's person (not his premises) incidental 
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. 
In Robinson it is conceded that there was probable cause (driving 
with a fraudulent license) for a custodial arrest. Judge Wright developed 
his position from Terry and Sibron, the "stop and frisk" cases allowing 
a "pat down" for weapons but nothing more. Judge Wright would allow 
a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a 
condition to a further search - a determination by the officer of probable 
cause or exigent circumstances. Not just for the arrest but for a search 
which goes beyond a mere frisk. 
In substance, Wright's opinion requires an independent evaluation 
of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest v.h ich goes 
beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not exist 
because of the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy 
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed 
sometime previously). 
2. 
I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established 
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would: 
(i) Weaken the capability of police officers to 
protect themselves when making lawful arrests. 
(ii) It depends upon subjective judgments, made on the 
spot by the arresting officers, which would be difficult if not 
impossible to apply; 
(iii) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing 
between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter 
for the scope of the particular search, introduces possibly far 
reaching consequences into this area of the law.* 
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda in my 
file, I would reverse Robinson. 
* * * * * 
Gustafson presents a more difficult problem. The traffic offense 
(weaving across the center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's 
permit) certainly justified a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so 
held. But the traffic offenses in Gustafson were minor compared to 
the fraudulent driver's license involved in Robinson. It could be argued 
that, in the Gustafson circumstances, a custodial arrest was unnecessary 
*This Court has many times articulated as a well settled principle the 
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See, ~· ~·, Weeks v. U.S., 
232 U.S. 383, 392; Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 158; Preston v. U.S., 
376 U.S. 364, 367; Peters v. U.S. (under the name of 'Sibron v. U. S-:-;3"92 
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. 77; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762-763; and Cupp v. Murphy, decided last May 29 (see SG's brief 
pp. 16-17). 
3. 
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate. 
If I start, as I do, from the position that a lawful custodial arrest 
justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the question remains 
open in a particular case as to whether a custodial arrest was in fact 
justified. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's opinion in Amador- Gonzales 
v. United States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext 
to enable the police to conduct an incidental search. While this might be 
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would not necessarily 
be a futile remedy in extreme cases. For example, on routine traffic 
violations (e. g. running a redlight or making a wrong left turn) most 
police departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a 
summons (absent a nonresident violator) if an officer, contrary to such 
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic 
violation, arguably this would be pretextual. 
I am inclined to remand 3IS:afson to afford him an opportunity to 
show that the arrest was pretextual under the facts of his case. 
lfp/ss 9/26/73 2cc Summary memo, prepared for possible use 
at Conference 
No. 72-936 U. S. v. Robinson 
No. 71 .. 1669 Gustafson v. Florida 
This memorandum is limited to the first of the two major questions 
involved in these cases, namely, what search is permissible incident to 
a lawful arrest for a traffic violation? 
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring 
separately) in an en banch opinion, severely limited the heretofore accepted 
rule that searches of an individual's person (not his premises) incidental 
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. 
In Robinson it is conceded that there was probable cause (driving 
with a fraudulent license) for a custodial arrest. Judge Wright developed 
his position from Terry and Sibron, the "stop and frisk" cases allowing 
a "pat down" for weapons but nothing more. Judge Wright would allow 
a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a 
condition to a further search -a determination by the officer of probable 
cause or exigent circumstances. Not just for the arrest but for a search 
which goes beyond a mere frisk. 
In substance, Wright's opinion requires an independent evaluation 
of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest Witch goes 
beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not exist 
because of the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy 
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed 
sometime previously). 
2. 
I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established 
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would: 
(i) Weaken the capability of police officers to 
protect themselves when making lawful arrests. 
( 11) It depends upon subjective judgments, made on the 
spot by the arresting officers, which would be difficult if not 
impossible to apply; 
(iii) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing 
between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter 
for the scope of the particular search, introduces possibly far 
reaching consequences into this area of the law. • 
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda in my 
file, I would reverse Robinson • 
• • • * * 
9ttstafson presents a more difficult problem. The traffic offense 
(weaving across tlte center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's 
permit) certainly justified a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so 
held. But the traffic offenses in Gustafson were minor compared to 
the fraudulent driver's license involved in Robinson. It could be acgued 
that, in the Gustafson circumstances, a custocdial arrest was unnecessary 
*This Court has many times articulated as a well settled principle the 
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See e. 1-, Weeks v. u.s., 
232 U.S. 383, 392; Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 1~15""8; Preston v. u:a, 
376 u.s. 364, 367; Peters v. U.S. (under the name of 81bron v. u. S:-;3'92 
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. 77; Chimel v. California~ u.s. 
752, '162-!l63; and Cupp v. Murphy, decided last May 29 (see SG's brief 
pp. 16-17). 
3. 
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate. 
If I start, as I do, from the position that a lawful custodial arrest 
justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the question remains 
open in a particular case as to whether a custodial arrest was in fact 
justified. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's opinion in Amador-Gonzales 
v. United States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext 
to enable the police to conduct an incidental search. While this might be 
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would not necessarily 
be a futile remedy in extreme cases. For example, on routine traffic 
violations (e. g. running a redlight or making a wrong left turn) most 
police departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a 
summons (absent a nonresident violator) if an officer, contrary to such 
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic 
violation, arguably this would be pretextual. 
I am inclined to remand nutafson to afford him an opportunity to 




United States v. Robinson 
Gustafson v. Florida 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
I have reread your opinions in Uniteg States v . 
United States District Court and Almeida-Sanche.z, and neither 
speaks directly to the issues rased here. Of course, you 
embraced the warrant requirement, but search incident to 
arrest has long been considered an exception thereto. The 
most nearly relevant passage comes from U.S._Qist Cta 
It is true that there have been some exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. LCitations omitted~? 
But those exceptions are few in number and carefully 
delineated ... ; in general they serve the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement officers to protect their 
own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction. 
Even while carving out those exceptions, the Court has 
reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 
and seiaures through the warrant procedure . " Terry 
v. Ohio, supra, at 20, •.. ; Chimel v. California, 
supra, at762 . 
32 LEd 2d 752, XK 767. This passage may be read to endorse 
in a general way the twin rationales of Terry as the only 
acceptable rationales for warrantless searches. I think this 
construction places too heavy a burden on the language used. 
It is clear that you were not addressing the case of a search 
incident to lawful arrest. In short, I think your opinions 
in past cases pose no substantial obstacle to your proposed 
resolution of Robinson and Gustafson. 
JCJjr 
• 
·, 
